People v. Barabasa
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused, Anastasia Barabasa, was charged with violation of Section 822 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila for habitually and idly loitering about cafes, drinking saloons, and hotels without visible means of support or lawful employment, and without having been previously convicted of vagrancy by competent courts. Procedural History: The municipal court of the City of Manila found the accused guilty and sentenced her to four months of prision, a fine of P100 with subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. She appealed to the Court of First Instance, where she was again convicted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, with costs. The Petition: The defense argued that the accused could not be convicted of vagrancy due to a lack of evidence that she had no visible means of support and that the sentence was erroneous because the court deprived her of the testimony of Sergeant L. R. Sneider, who would have testified to her receiving a monthly pension of P25.
Issue(s)
Whether the accused can be convicted of vagrancy under Section 822 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. Whether the refusal of the court to postpone the trial to allow the testimony of Sergeant L. R. Sneider constitutes reversible error.
Ruling
The appealed sentence is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the accused-appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of vagrancy: The Court held that Section 822 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila defines eleven kinds of vagrancy, one of which is habitually and idly loitering about hotels, cafes, drinking saloons, and similar establishments. Citing the case of United States vs. Giner Cruz, the Court clarified that visible means of support is not an essential element of this particular infraction. The evidence presented demonstrated that the accused habitually and idly loitered about the specified places, behaving as a woman of ill repute and catering to soldiers' pleasures at night. Therefore, the Court found her guilty of vagrancy under the said ordinance, as the proven acts satisfied the definition of the offense. On the issue of the court's refusal to postpone the trial: The Court ruled that the trial court's refusal to postpone the trial to allow Sergeant Sneider to testify did not constitute a substantial error. The defense intended to present Sneider to corroborate the accused's testimony that she received a monthly pension of P25. The Court found this evidence to be merely cumulative and, more importantly, immaterial and unnecessary. It reasoned that even if the accused received a pension, it would not have altered the outcome of the case, as the conviction for vagrancy was based on her habitual loitering and behavior, not solely on the lack of visible means of support. Thus, the accused was not deprived of any substantial right.
Main Doctrine
A person habitually and idly loitering about hotels, cafes, and drinking saloons, behaving as a woman of ill repute and catering to soldiers' pleasures at night, is guilty of vagrancy under Section 822 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, even if she has visible means of support, as the latter is not an essential element of this specific infraction.