People v. Hermino
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The appellant, Lope Hermino y Limosa, was charged with theft. The information alleged that on or about December 26, 1936, in Manila, he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously took a leather pocketbook valued at P1 containing P14.17 cash, belonging to Mrs. W. G. Schindler, causing a total damage of P15.17. The information also detailed prior convictions for theft on January 20, 1934, June 28, 1936, and June 29, 1936, establishing him as a habitual delinquent under Article 62, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. 2. Procedural History: The case originated in the municipal court of Manila, where the appellant initially went to trial and presented evidence after the prosecution had done so. He was found guilty of theft by the municipal court. Subsequently, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. In the Court of First Instance, he was permitted to change his plea from not guilty to guilty. The Court of First Instance sentenced him to one month and one day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the owner in the sum of P15.17, and to an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for being a habitual delinquent. 3. The Petition: The defendant appealed the sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance. His appeal raised two main contentions: first, that the lower court erred in deciding that his spontaneous plea of guilty had been compensated by recidivism, and second, that the lower court erred in imposing an additional penalty not in accordance with the allegations in the information. The Solicitor-General, in response, raised a related question: whether the appellant's plea of guilty, entered in the Court of First Instance on appeal, should be considered in his favor despite having gone to trial in the municipal court.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellant's plea of guilty, entered in the Court of First Instance on appeal, should be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance, notwithstanding that he had gone to trial in the municipal court and presented evidence therein. Whether the appellant is a habitual delinquent and the proper penalty to be imposed.
Ruling
The appealed judgment is modified. The appellant is sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor, plus the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance: The Court held that the appellant's plea of guilty, entered in the Court of First Instance after the case had originated in the municipal court where he had already gone to trial and presented evidence, cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, subsection 7 of the Revised Penal Code. The law requires the confession to be spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. The appeal to the Court of First Instance does not restore the case to its original de novo status in a manner that would negate the prior presentation of evidence. The spirit of the law, which is to recognize repentance and submission to the law, is absent when an accused only confesses after his initial trial has failed. Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt cannot be applied. On the issue of habitual delinquency and penalty: The Court clarified the application of Article 62, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code concerning habitual delinquency. While the information alleged three prior convictions, the Court found that the appellant was only a recidivist for the third time, not the fourth, for the purposes of habitual delinquency. This was because the commission and prosecution of his last two prior offenses occurred very close in time, indicating that the judgment for the preceding offense may not have become final before the next offense was committed or prosecuted. Following established jurisprudence, the Court determined that the appellant deserved the least additional penalty prescribed for habitual delinquency, which is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Consequently, the penalty imposed by the lower court, which included a six-year and one-day prision mayor additional penalty for habitual delinquency, was deemed excessive. The Court modified the sentence to four months and one day of arresto mayor (maximum period of arresto mayor as the principal penalty, considering the absence of the mitigating circumstance of confession and the presence of recidivism) plus an additional penalty of two years, four months and one day, which corresponds to the least additional penalty for habitual delinquency.
Main Doctrine
A plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has presented its evidence, even if made during an appeal to a higher court, does not qualify as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, subsection 7 of the Revised Penal Code, as the law requires the confession to be spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.