Tuason v. Barreto Y Rocha
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns the intestate estate of Augusto H. Tuason and the administration of the mayorazgo Tuason. The Supreme Court had previously ordered the trial court to take steps for the adjudication and distribution of participations among interested parties to terminate the mayorazgo suit. Procedural History: To execute the decision, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila ordered the receiver bank to compute participations. The bank submitted reports detailing lineal and collateral heirs and their respective shares. The CFI approved these reports, ordering defendants to pay specific sums representing participations in income and fruits from various periods, and to deposit a sum for collateral heirs, warning of execution upon failure. The CFI subsequently ordered the distribution of funds among lineal heirs and directed the deposit of funds for collateral heirs, reducing the amount based on deductions. The defendants excepted to these orders, filed motions for reconsideration, and sought extensions for liquidation. The CFI denied these motions and reiterated the order for deposit, warning of attachment. The defendants excepted, announced their intention to appeal, and filed a bill of exceptions. However, intervenors moved for execution, which the CFI granted, ordering a writ of execution. The CFI later disapproved the bill of exceptions and denied motions for reconsideration, ordering the issuance of a writ of execution against the properties of the defendants. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of the bill of exceptions, which was denied. The Petition: Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to restrain the CFI from proceeding with the execution of interlocutory orders and, subsidiarily, a writ of mandamus to compel the CFI to approve and certify their bill of exceptions. They argued that the CFI acted arbitrarily and in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of execution, that the order to be executed was interlocutory, and that it included parties not originally defendants. They also contended that the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in making the defendants jointly and severally liable instead of merely jointly liable. Regarding the mandamus, they argued that the bill of exceptions was filed within the granted extension and should have been approved.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of November 3, 1936, decreeing the issuance of a writ of execution. Whether the order of June 17, 1936, which the writ of execution sought to enforce, was interlocutory or final and executory. Whether the persons named in the order of November 3, 1936, were properly included as parties liable. Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in making the defendants jointly and severally liable. Whether the disapproval of the bill of exceptions was justified, and if mandamus lies to compel its approval.
Ruling
The petition is denied in toto, with costs to the petitioners. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent judge.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court found that the respondent judge did not act arbitrarily or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of November 3, 1936. This order decreed the issuance of a writ of execution against the named persons for the payment of P133,690.67, the deposit of which had been ordered on June 17, 1936, and was not complied with by the defendants without any valid reason. The order of execution was issued after the court had disapproved the defendants' bill of exceptions on October 27, 1936, indicating a procedural progression rather than arbitrary action. On Issue 2: The Court held that the order of June 17, 1936, which the writ of execution sought to enforce, was not interlocutory but was final and executory in character. This order finally decided the incident relative to the deposit of P133,690.67 required for the distribution of income among the collateral heirs, thereby putting an end to that specific incidental question. The defendants' failure to appeal from this order rendered it final and unassailable. On Issue 3: The Court clarified that the persons named in the order of November 3, 1936, were either original defendants or heirs or successors in interest of the original defendants. Furthermore, it noted that any persons mentioned in the order who were not original defendants were not represented by the attorneys for the defendants, implying that those attorneys could not institute the petition for certiorari in their name on behalf of such individuals. On Issue 4: The Court found that the allegation of abuse of jurisdiction regarding joint and several liability was unfounded. The order of November 3, 1936, did not determine the extent of the responsibility of the defendants in the payment of the sum of P133,690.67, meaning the alleged abuse of jurisdiction attributed to the court did not exist. The order simply directed the execution of a prior order that had determined the liability. On Issue 5: The Court ruled that the disapproval of the bill of exceptions was justified, and therefore, mandamus would not lie to compel its approval. The defendants had appealed only from the orders of July 24 and August 24, 1936, which were merely interlocutory orders denying motions for reconsideration and were not appealable. While these orders were subject to exception, they were related to the final order of June 17, 1936, which was the truly appealable order. However, the defendants failed to appeal from the order of June 17, 1936. Furthermore, even if the bill of exceptions were considered an appeal from the June 17th order, it was filed outside the statutory period because the intervening motions did not interrupt the period for appeal, as they were not based on grounds for a new trial and did not seek annulment of the order. The extension for filing the bill of exceptions was also erroneously granted as the period had already elapsed.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that a writ of certiorari is not a remedy for correcting errors of judgment or procedure, but only for correcting acts performed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Similarly, a writ of mandamus is not to compel an exercise of judgment or discretion, but to enforce a ministerial duty. The Court emphasized that orders denying motions for reconsideration, if not based on the grounds provided by law for a new trial, are interlocutory and not appealable, and that failure to appeal a final and executory order within the reglementary period bars further recourse.