People v. Lam
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused, Yu Guioc Lam (alias Yu Kim Lam), failed to appear on the scheduled trial date of June 19, 1935. Consequently, the court ordered the arrest of the accused and the confiscation of his bail bond. The surety company, Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation, was duly notified of this order. Procedural History: On July 10, 1935, the surety company produced the accused before the court and filed a motion praying for the lifting of the order of confiscation. The surety alleged that the accused offered to file a new bond through a local surety company, and thus, its own bond should be cancelled. The court found the accused's explanation for his non-appearance satisfactory, set aside the confiscation order, but did not cancel the Visayan Surety's bond as the new bond had not yet been approved. The case was reset for trial on July 29, 1935. The accused again failed to appear, leading the court to order his arrest and the confiscation of the Visayan Surety's bond. The Petition: The Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation appealed the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied its motion to be relieved of its bail bond after delivering the accused to the court on July 10, 1935.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in releasing the accused after the appellant had turned over his person to said court, without first requiring said accused to file a new and distinct bond for his provisional release pending trial. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that the arrest and delivery of the body of the accused unto it released the bail bond of the surety-appellant. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that the issuance of an order for the arrest of the accused and the latter's custody thereunder, was an act of the state operating as a discharge of the surety-appellant's bond. Whether the lower court erred in interpreting the appellant's petition dated July 10, 1935, praying for the cancellation of its bond to be conditioned upon the filing and approval of a new bond then announced by the accused.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court in toto, holding that the surety company remained liable on its bond.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the lower court erred in releasing the accused after the appellant had turned over his person to said court, without first requiring said accused to file a new and distinct bond for his provisional release pending trial: The Court held that the mere presentation of the accused in open court is not sufficient to relieve the surety. The attention of the court must be called to the presence of the accused, and the intention to surrender the body of the accused must be clearly and definitely stated and understood by the court. A surety is not relieved from liability until the court accepts the surrender, and the only evidence of such an act is the record of the court. In this case, it did not appear that the fiscal had been notified of the petition for discharge, nor had the court issued an order of discharge. On the issue of whether the lower court erred in not finding that the arrest and delivery of the body of the accused unto it released the bail bond of the surety-appellant: The Court reiterated that for a surety to be relieved from liability by surrendering the accused, it is necessary that the fiscal be notified of such surrender and of the petition for release. The mere presence of the accused in court is insufficient. The court must clearly and definitely understand the surety's intention to surrender the accused. The surety is only relieved from liability when the court accepts the surrender and issues an order of release. On the issue of whether the lower court erred in not finding that the issuance of an order for the arrest of the accused and the latter's custody thereunder, was an act of the state operating as a discharge of the surety-appellant's bond: The Court found that the surety's actions on July 10, 1935, which included presenting the accused and asking for the cancellation of its bond and lifting of the confiscation order, did not constitute a discharge. The surety did not notify the fiscal of the surrender or petition for release, nor did it call the court's attention to its desire to surrender the accused. Since the petition was not approved and the bond was not cancelled, it remained in force. On the issue of whether the lower court erred in interpreting the appellant's petition dated July 10, 1935, praying for the cancellation of its bond to be conditioned upon the filing and approval of a new bond then announced by the accused: The Court noted that the lower court did not declare the Visayan Surety's bond cancelled because the new bond offered by the accused had not yet been approved. The surety's petition was not approved by the Court of First Instance, and therefore, the bond continued to be in force. When the accused failed to appear on July 29, 1935, the surety violated the conditions of its bond for the second time.
Main Doctrine
The mere presentation of the person of an accused before the court by the surety thereof, which asks for the cancellation of the bond filed by it for the provisional release of said accused, without notice to the fiscal and without the court having accepted the person of the accused or cancelled the bond in question, is not sufficient to relieve the surety from the liability contracted by it by virtue of its bond.