People v. Pontillas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Remigio Pontillas (appellee) was charged with violation of conditional pardon. He had been granted a pardon on September 8, 1922, by the Governor-General, remitting the unexecuted portion of his sentence of six years and one day of prision correccional for illegal marriage. This pardon was subject to the condition that he would not violate any penal laws of the Philippine Islands, which he accepted. On December 24, 1935, Pontillas committed the crime of damage to property through reckless driving, for which he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of P61 and an indemnity of P60.30, with thirty days' subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He commenced serving this subsidiary imprisonment on June 26, 1936. Procedural History: Pontillas filed a demurrer to the information, arguing that the facts charged did not constitute a public offense and would exempt him from criminal liability. The lower court sustained the demurrer, holding that the original penalty for illegal marriage had prescribed by the time he committed the second offense. The fiscal appealed this resolution. The Petition: The People of the Philippines appealed the lower court's decision, questioning whether a person conditionally pardoned can be prosecuted for violating the pardon if the original penalty had allegedly prescribed before the commission of the second offense.
Issue(s)
Whether the penalty for illegal marriage had prescribed by December 24, 1935. Whether the commission of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence constitutes a violation of the condition of the conditional pardon. Whether a conditional pardon, once accepted, creates a contractual obligation that binds the convict to its terms.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, reversing the lower court's resolution. It ordered that the trial proceed in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the penalty for illegal marriage had prescribed by December 24, 1935: The Court clarified that the penalty for illegal marriage was prision mayor, not prision correccional, due to its duration (six years and one day) and the nature of the crime. The prescription period for prision mayor is fifteen years. From February 14, 1921, when the penalty was imposed, to December 24, 1935, only fourteen years, ten months, and ten days had elapsed. Therefore, the penalty had not yet prescribed. Furthermore, the acceptance of the conditional pardon, which allowed the appellee to avoid serving the remainder of his sentence, interrupted the period of prescription. This interruption is akin to a convict escaping service by fleeing to a foreign country with no extradition treaty, as the convict is essentially avoiding the obligation to serve the sentence. On whether the commission of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence constitutes a violation of the condition of the conditional pardon: The Court held that the condition of the pardon was not limited to committing crimes showing moral perversity but extended to any violation of any penal law of the Philippines. The crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence is expressly punished by law (Article 356 in relation to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code). Therefore, by committing this offense, the appellee willfully and unlawfully violated the condition of his pardon. On whether a conditional pardon, once accepted, creates a contractual obligation that binds the convict to its terms: The Court affirmed that a conditional pardon is a contract between the Chief Executive and the convict. It becomes perfected upon notification and acceptance by the convict with all its conditions. As a contract, the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its conditions and accept all its consequences according to its strict terms. Failure to do so places the convict in the same situation as before the pardon, making them liable to serve the remainder of their original sentence.
Main Doctrine
A conditional pardon is a contract between the Chief Executive and the convict, and its violation by the convict binds them to fulfill its conditions. The commission of any penal offense, regardless of its gravity, constitutes a violation of the condition not to violate any penal law, thereby revoking the pardon and making the convict liable for the unserved portion of the original sentence.