People v. Reyes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information was filed charging Esminia Pudol and Alberto Reyes with perjury. Esminia Pudol allegedly subscribed a false affidavit with the cooperation of Alberto Reyes. Procedural History: The provincial fiscal moved for the discharge of Esminia Pudol to be utilized as a witness for the prosecution against Alberto Reyes. Alberto Reyes pleaded not guilty, but later withdrew his plea. The trial court dismissed the case against Esminia Pudol as requested by the fiscal. Subsequently, Alberto Reyes moved for the dismissal of the case against him, arguing that without the principal offender (Pudol), there was no ground to prosecute him, and that subornation of perjury was no longer penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The trial court dismissed the case against Reyes based on the first ground, deeming it unnecessary to pass upon the second. The Petition: The People of the Philippines appealed the dismissal order issued by the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether the order of dismissal is appealable by the fiscal. Whether the dismissal of the case against Esminia Pudol, the alleged principal offender, warrants the dismissal of the case against Alberto Reyes, the alleged suborner. Whether subornation of perjury is a punishable offense under the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings. The Court held that the dismissal order was appealable, that subornation of perjury is punishable under Article 17(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and that Alberto Reyes could be prosecuted as a principal by induction or by cooperation and participation.
Ratio Decidendi
On the appealability of the dismissal order: The Court held that the order of dismissal was appealable. It reasoned that Alberto Reyes had withdrawn his plea of not guilty, meaning the case had not been decided on its merits. Furthermore, the dismissal was not an acquittal of the accused, thus falling within the purview of appealable orders under Section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. The contention that the dismissal was on the merits was deemed untenable because the accused had not yet pleaded to the information. On the dismissal of the case against Alberto Reyes: The Court found the trial court's reasoning for dismissing the case against Reyes to be flawed. The fiscal's motion for Pudol's discharge stated that her testimony was necessary and could be corroborated, not that her guilt could not be proven. The Court clarified that the fiscal sought Pudol's discharge not because she was innocent, but to use her as a witness. Her discharge, under Act No. 2709, afforded her immunity but did not restore her presumption of innocence in a manner that would preclude the prosecution of Reyes. The Court emphasized that the dismissal of the case against Pudol did not automatically absolve Reyes, especially since Reyes was also charged with direct participation in the false affidavit. On the punishability of subornation of perjury: The Court clarified that subornation of perjury is indeed a punishable offense under the Revised Penal Code. It pointed to Article 17, subsection 2, which defines principals as "Those who directly force or induce others to commit it." The information charged Reyes with directly inducing Pudol to commit perjury and cooperating in the execution of the false affidavit. Therefore, even if subornation was not explicitly penalized as a separate crime, the act of inducing another to commit perjury fell squarely within the definition of a principal under Article 17(2). Moreover, Reyes was also charged as a principal by cooperation and participation in the preparation of the false affidavit.
Main Doctrine
Subornation of perjury, though not expressly penalized as a distinct crime in the Revised Penal Code, is punishable under Article 17, subsection 2, of the same Code, which defines principals as those who directly induce others to commit a crime. Furthermore, an accused charged with subornation can also be held liable as a principal by cooperation or participation in the commission of the false affidavit.