Zandueta v. De la Costa
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the occupancy of the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District. Petitioner Francisco Zandueta claims entitlement to this position, while respondent Sixto de la Costa currently holds it. The core of the matter revolves around the validity of appointments and the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the Judicial Reorganization Law. 2. Procedural History: Petitioner Francisco Zandueta, initially holding an ad interim appointment as judge of the Ninth Judicial District (Manila), received a new ad interim appointment under Commonwealth Act No. 145 to the Fourth Judicial District, which included Manila and Palawan. This new appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before the National Assembly adjourned, leading to a subsequent ad interim appointment and qualification by Zandueta. However, the Commission on Appointments later disapproved this appointment. Subsequently, respondent Sixto de la Costa received an ad interim appointment to the same position, which was approved by the Commission on Appointments, and he assumed office. Zandueta then initiated this quo warranto proceeding. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Francisco Zandueta filed a quo warranto petition seeking to oust respondent Sixto de la Costa from the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, and to be reinstated himself. Zandueta argues that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional. The respondent, however, contends that Zandueta is estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the Act because he voluntarily accepted the new appointment issued under it, qualified for the office, and performed its duties, thereby abandoning his prior appointment.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner is estopped from questioning the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145 after having accepted a new appointment and performed the duties thereunder. Whether the acceptance of the new appointment under the Fourth Judicial District constituted an abandonment of the petitioner's former office under the Ninth Judicial District.
Ruling
The petition for quo warranto is denied and dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145. Applying the rule of equity sanctioned by jurisprudence, the Court held that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to a reorganized office, qualifies for it, and receives the salary, he cannot later challenge the law's validity. Referring to the principles in Cruz v. Youngberg (56 Phil. 234), the Court noted that a party cannot enjoy the benefits of a statute and later claim it is unconstitutional when those benefits are withdrawn. The petitioner was under no compulsion to accept the ad interim appointment; had he believed the law unconstitutional, he should have refused the appointment or accepted it with reservation. By entering into the discharge of his duties with full knowledge that the appointment was subject to the Commission on Appointments' approval, he assumed the risk of its eventual disapproval. On Issue 2: The Court found that the petitioner's acceptance of the new office resulted in the abandonment of his former office. There was a clear incompatibility between the two appointments because the new one (Fourth Judicial District) encompassed a wider territory (Manila and Palawan) than the old one (Manila only). Under the rule of incompatibility, the acceptance of a second office that is inconsistent with the first results in the vacation of the former. The petitioner's acts in Palawan, which were not authorized under his 1936 appointment, evidenced a clear intention to operate under the new appointment. Consequently, when the Commission on Appointments disapproved the new appointment, he had already ipso jure ceased to hold the old office and could not claim a right to repossess it.
Main Doctrine
A public official who voluntarily accepts a new appointment to an office incompatible with the one formerly occupied, qualifies for its discharge, and performs its duties, is deemed to have abandoned the former office and is estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new appointment was issued.