People v. Aquino
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information was filed charging Alberto Aquino with serious oral defamation committed on September 8, 1935, against Marcial Kasilag. The offended party claimed to have discovered the defamation on March 4, 1936. Procedural History: The first complaint was filed on March 4, 1936. Due to the involuntary absences of the complainant, the trial was suspended, and the case was provisionally dismissed upon motion of the defendant on January 21, 1937, without prejudice to the fiscal reproducing the action. Twenty-three days after this dismissal, on February 13, 1937, the offended party filed another complaint in the justice of the peace court. After waiving preliminary investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, and the fiscal filed an information on June 10, 1937. The accused raised defenses of double jeopardy and prescription, later waiving the former to insist on prescription. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case, leading to the fiscal's appeal. The Appeal: The fiscal appealed the order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance, which held that the crime had prescribed. The sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether the crime of serious oral defamation had prescribed under the given circumstances.
Issue(s)
Whether the crime of serious oral defamation, as charged, has prescribed. Whether the filing of the complaint and subsequent dismissal of the case interrupted the prescriptive period.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal. It held that the crime had not prescribed and ordered that the proceedings take their ordinary course.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the crime of serious oral defamation, as charged, has prescribed: The period of prescription for oral defamation is six months, computed from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, as per Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, the offended party discovered the defamation on March 4, 1936. Thus, the six-month prescriptive period would expire around September 4, 1936. The filing of the first complaint on March 4, 1936, effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period on that very day, as mandated by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescriptive period commenced to run anew only from January 21, 1937, the date of the dismissal of the first case. Since only twenty-three days elapsed from January 21, 1937, to February 13, 1937 (the date of filing the second complaint), the crime had not yet prescribed. On Whether the filing of the complaint and subsequent dismissal of the case interrupted the prescriptive period: Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The dismissal of the first case on January 21, 1937, was ordered 'without prejudice' to the fiscal, and importantly, the accused himself had moved for the dismissal. By acceding to the condition of dismissal without prejudice, the accused implicitly agreed that the proceedings could be reinstituted. Therefore, the filing of the complaint on March 4, 1936, interrupted the prescription. The prescriptive period then commenced to run again from January 21, 1937, the date of the dismissal, as the prosecution was effectively stopped on that date. The subsequent filing of the second complaint within the renewed period meant that the action was timely filed.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a complaint or information interrupts the period of prescription of the offense. According to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and it commences to run again from the date of the dismissal of the case if the dismissal itself is the event that stops the prosecution. This is particularly relevant when a case is dismissed without prejudice, and the accused had moved for such dismissal.