Saavedra v. Price
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a P15,000 credit secured by a mortgage on real property. This credit originated from a loan granted by W.S. Price. In a prior civil case (No. 3569), a deed of sale involving the property was rescinded, and title was to be reissued in favor of Ceferino Ibañez and Aleida Saavedra, with a notation of the mortgage to W.S. Price and a judgment from another case. Procedural History: In civil case No. 3707, the Court of First Instance of Leyte ordered the defendants, including Ceferino Ibañez and Rafael Martinez, to pay W.S. Price P15,000 within ninety days, with a provision for public auction of the mortgaged real property in case of default. This court, on appeal (G.R. No. 44974), modified the judgment, ordering Rafael Martinez and Ceferino Ibañez to pay the P15,000 within ninety days from the decision's finality. After their failure to pay, W.S. Price moved for the sale of the mortgaged property. The hearing for this motion was postponed at the petitioner's request, first to April 22, 1939, and then definitely to May 6, 1939. Despite a further request for postponement due to bad weather on May 4, 1939, the hearing proceeded, and the order for the sale was issued on May 8, 1939. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: This proceeding was instituted by Aleida Saavedra, the petitioner, seeking to annul the May 8, 1939 order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The petitioner argues that the respondent Judge abused his discretion by not postponing the hearing for the sale of the mortgaged realty and exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering the sale. Specifically, she claims she acted as a surety for Rafael Martinez, the principal debtor, and as such, is entitled to the benefit of exhaustion of the principal debtor's property, as per Article 1830 of the Civil Code. The petition is filed under the premise that the order for sale was improperly issued and that her rights as a surety were violated.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the postponement of the hearing for the sale of the mortgaged realty. Whether the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the sale of the mortgaged property, considering the petitioner's alleged status as a surety and owner of the property.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is denied. The order of May 8, 1939, directing the sale of the mortgaged realty, is affirmed as it was rendered in accordance with law and within the jurisdiction and discretion of the respondent Judge.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of abuse of discretion in denying postponement: The Court held that the respondent Judge made good use of his discretion in denying the postponement. The hearing had already been postponed definitely to another date upon the petitioner's own petition. Furthermore, a motion to sell mortgaged realty can be heard ex parte without the presence of the petitioner, as the original judgment already ordered the sale of the mortgaged property in case of default. This is consistent with the ruling in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. De las Cajigas. On the issue of exceeding jurisdiction in ordering the sale: The Court found this contention unfounded and untenable. The alleged defense that the petitioner, as a surety, is entitled to the benefit of exhaustion of the principal debtor's property should have been interposed before the judgment was rendered, not as an opposition to the motion for sale. It is too late to raise such a defense at this stage. Moreover, the mortgaged property belonging to the petitioner, even if she acted as surety, is legally subject to sale. The lien imposed was valid under Article 1857 (paragraph 3) of the Civil Code, and upon default, the property is subject to sale as per Articles 1858 and 1876 of the Civil Code and Sections 256 and 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While she may have remedies against the principal debtor as a surety, she was sued and the property was mortgaged as a principal debtor by virtue of her ownership of the mortgaged property.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari to annul an order for the sale of mortgaged realty will be denied where the order was issued in accordance with law and the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction and discretion, especially when the defense of benefit of exhaustion should have been interposed before judgment and the mortgaged property is legally subject to sale upon default.