Almeida Viuda de Carrillo v. Carrillo de Galang
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Macario Carrillo died on May 17, 1931, leaving a widow, Rosenda Almeida (appellee), and three children from his first marriage, Corazon Edelmira Carrillo, Romulo Carrillo, and Gracia Carrillo (appellants). With the consent of all relatives, the deceased was buried in a private lot in the North Cemetery, Manila, with an agreement for later transfer within three to five years upon payment of P100. Procedural History: Intestate proceedings were commenced. In the project of partition, approved by the court, all co-heirs agreed that the appellee (widow) would undertake the expenses for the last illness, funeral, and care of the tomb. The Petition: In January 1963, the appellee built a mausoleum. Shortly before the five-year period for exhumation expired, the appellants secured the appellee's consent to transfer the remains to Ermita Church, Manila, under the pretense that it was temporary and would facilitate transfer to the Biñan mausoleum. Upon learning from her lawyer that she should not have consented, the appellee withdrew her consent. As the appellants were proceeding with the transfer, the appellee moved for an injunction. The court made the preliminary injunction permanent, ordering the appellants to abstain from removing the remains. The appellants perfected their appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellants have a better right than the appellee to disinter and transfer the remains of the deceased. Whether the appellee's consent to the transfer to Ermita Church, once given, is binding and cannot be withdrawn.
Ruling
The Court affirmed the order of the lower court, making the preliminary injunction permanent. The appellants were ordered to abstain from removing the remains of the deceased and transferring them to another place. The appellee has a better right than the appellants to control the disposition of the deceased's remains.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of who has a better right to disinter and transfer the remains: The Court held that the appellee, as the widow, has a preferred right. This is based on the spirit of Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code, which, while pertaining to the obligation to bury, indicates a preference for the surviving spouse. Furthermore, the Court cited American jurisprudence which consistently holds that the surviving spouse has the primary and paramount right to control the burial and disposition of the deceased's remains, superior to that of the next of kin. The Court also emphasized that the agreement in the partition, approved by the court, where the appellee undertook the care of the tomb, is decisive of the controversy. This agreement, interpreted broadly, grants the appellee the right to determine the final resting place of the deceased. On the issue of the binding effect of the appellee's consent: The Court found no merit in the appellants' contention that the appellee's consent to the transfer to Ermita Church was binding. The Court found that the appellee erroneously gave her consent because she was made to believe by the appellants that the transfer would only be temporary and would facilitate the subsequent transfer to the mausoleum she had built. This vitiated consent, based on misrepresentation, could not validly bind her right to control the disposition of her husband's remains.
Main Doctrine
In the absence of express law, the agreement of the parties regarding the disposition of the deceased's remains, as approved by the court, is decisive. Furthermore, the surviving spouse generally holds a preferred and superior right over the next of kin concerning the care, possession, and disposition of the deceased's remains, a principle supported by American jurisprudence.