Rodriguez v. Tirona
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a claim by Manuel Rodriguez (appellant) to a portion of land, Lot No. 1128, registered in the name of Daniel Tirona and Felisa Osorio (appellees). The appellant alleges that a 1911 agreement established an embankment as the true boundary between his land (Lot No. 1127) and the appellees' land (Lot No. 1128). This alleged agreement and a subsequent survey purportedly show that a portion of land, now included in the appellees' registered title, rightfully belongs to the appellant. 2. Procedural History: Lot No. 1128 was adjudicated to the Tirona spouses in 1915, with a decree issued in 1916 and the original title in the same year. Nineteen years later, in December 1935, the appellant filed motions seeking to approve a subdivision plan of Lot No. 1128, segregating the portion he claims, and to cancel the existing title and issue new ones. The appellees opposed this motion. Subsequently, the appellees filed a motion seeking a writ of possession to remove the appellant and his tenants from portions of Lot No. 1128 they allegedly occupied. The trial court initially denied the appellant's motion and the appellees' motion for a writ of possession. However, upon the appellees filing an amended motion, the court reversed its earlier decision and held it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of possession. The appellant appealed both the denial of his motion and the subsequent order asserting jurisdiction over the writ of possession. 3. The Petition: The appellant seeks review of the lower court's orders. Primarily, he appeals the denial of his motion to amend the registered plan of Lot No. 1128 and to segregate a portion claimed under a prior agreement, arguing it was an error in the original title due to his claim. He also appeals the order asserting jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession in favor of the appellees, contending that such a writ is not the proper remedy against him as he was not an original oppositor in the land registration case. The appellant argues that his motion was not a revision of the decree but a correction of an error in the title based on an agreement, while the appellees maintain that any such claim is barred by the lapse of time since the original registration and decree.
Issue(s)
Whether the plan of a registered land may be amended to segregate a portion claimed by an adjoining owner nineteen years after the issuance of the decree of registration. Whether a writ of possession may be issued to recover portions of registered land nineteen years after the issuance of the decree of registration and title, against a party who was not an oppositor in the original registration proceedings.
Ruling
The appealed order denying the motion to amend the plan is affirmed. The appealed order holding itself competent to pass upon the motion for a writ of possession is reversed. The court affirmed its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for writ of possession, but the writ of possession does not lie against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of amending the plan and segregating a portion of registered land: The Court held that the appellant's claim is indefensible due to the lapse of nineteen years. The appellant failed to amend his plan or the appellee's plan after the alleged agreement, did not file opposition during the registration to exclude the claimed portion, and did not file a petition for review within the statutory period of one year to set aside the decree of registration. Therefore, the appellant has lost any right he may have had to ask for the amendment of the plan or to claim the portion of land. The Court emphasized that any amendment to the certificate of title would constitute a revision of the decree of registration, which is illegal after the lapse of more than nineteen years. The Court cited De los Reyes vs. Paterno (34 Phil., 420) to the effect that failure to present objections or question the validity of registration within one year after the issuance of the certificate forever bars the right, even if any right existed. On the issue of issuing a writ of possession: The Court acknowledged that under section 17 of the Land Registration Act, courts of first instance can enforce orders and issue writs of possession in land registration cases. However, the Court clarified that a writ of possession is generally issued against defeated oppositors in the registration case. In this instance, the appellant Manuel Rodriguez was not a party in the case as an oppositor against the registration applied for by the appellees. Therefore, the writ of possession does not lie against him. The proper and adequate remedy for the appellees in this situation is an ordinary action, citing Manuel vs. Rosauro (56 Phil., 365) and Manlapas and Tolentino vs. Llorente (48 Phil., 298). The Court reversed the order of February 13, 1936, which held the court competent to pass upon the amended motion for a writ of possession.
Main Doctrine
A motion to amend a plan and segregate a portion of registered land, or to issue a writ of possession, filed nineteen years after the issuance of the decree of registration and title, is barred by prescription and laches, as any legal action to review, alter, or amend the decree has prescribed. A writ of possession is generally issued against defeated oppositors, not against a party who was not an oppositor in the original registration proceedings.