Salao v. Santos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs Rufina Salao and Lucio Lucas operated a smoked fish factory (umbuyan) in Malabon, Rizal, prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929. This ordinance required factories using fuel to have proper chimneys and maintain specific distances from neighboring buildings. Procedural History: Lucio Lucas was previously prosecuted for non-compliance with the ordinance but was acquitted. Subsequently, a neighbor, Eligio Gozon, complained to the Bureau of Health, which investigated and found the factory non-compliant. The municipal president was directed to enforce the ordinance. The municipal council later enacted Ordinance No. 10, series of 1935, which amended Ordinance No. 23 of 1929, stating it would only apply to factories established after its approval and would not apply to those already operating. The Petition: The plaintiffs filed an action for injunction to restrain the municipal president from enforcing his order to comply with the 1929 ordinance, citing the subsequent amendatory ordinance of 1935. The trial court dismissed the action, leading to this appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, has retrospective effect. Whether the plaintiffs' smoked fish factory constitutes a nuisance per accidens requiring due hearing for abatement.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, ordering the dismissal of the injunction case. It held that Municipal Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, was intended to have prospective operation only and that the plaintiffs' factory, being established prior to its enactment, was not subject to its provisions. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the factory was not a nuisance per se and, if it were a nuisance per accidens, it could not be abated without due hearing.
Ratio Decidendi
On the prospective operation of Municipal Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929: The Court held that municipal ordinances, similar to statutes, are presumed to operate prospectively unless a retrospective effect is expressly stated or necessarily implied. The language of the ordinance, referring to "fabrica o negocio que se ha de levantar" (factory or business to be established), indicated an intention for prospective application. This intention was further confirmed by Ordinance No. 10 of 1935, which explicitly stated that the amended ordinance "shall not be applicable to those already operating at the time of the approval" of the 1929 ordinance. The Court found no indication in the original ordinance that it was meant to apply to existing establishments, thus reinforcing the principle of prospective construction. The validity of the amendatory ordinance was upheld, irrespective of the municipal president's alleged personal motives, as the municipal council's enactment was presumed to be a valid expression of its intent and was duly approved by the provincial board. On whether the plaintiffs' smoked fish factory constitutes a nuisance per accidens requiring due hearing for abatement: The Court distinguished between nuisances per se and nuisances per accidens. A nuisance per se is inherently a nuisance under all circumstances, posing a direct menace to public health or safety, and may be abated summarily. In contrast, a nuisance per accidens is one that becomes a nuisance due to specific conditions and circumstances, requiring a factual determination and a due hearing before a competent tribunal for its abatement. The Court classified the plaintiffs' smoked fish factory as a legitimate industry, not a nuisance per se. If it were indeed a nuisance, it would be a nuisance per accidens, arising from its manner of operation. Consequently, the orders issued by the municipal president and health authorities for its summary abatement, based solely on their own findings without a judicial hearing, were deemed null and void. The principle of due process mandates that a hearing must be afforded before an establishment can be declared a nuisance per accidens and abated.
Main Doctrine
Municipal ordinances, like statutes, are construed to have prospective operation unless retrospective effect is expressly declared or necessarily implied. A nuisance per accidens requires due hearing before abatement.