Amante v. Hidalgo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns allegations of violations of the Corporation Law by "Colegio de San Jose," a corporation sole. Specifically, the petition alleges a failure to file a certified copy of its by-laws despite a request from the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, which could warrant the forfeiture of its corporate franchise. 2. Procedural History: The case originated in the Court of First Instance of Manila when Pedro Amante, a private citizen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition sought to compel the Solicitor-General to initiate quo warranto proceedings against "Colegio de San Jose." The Solicitor-General demurred to the petition, arguing that the discretion vested in him by law could not be controlled by mandamus and that the petition failed to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained, and upon the petitioner's failure to amend his complaint, the court rendered judgment against him. 3. The Petition: The petitioner-appellant, Pedro Amante, sought a writ of mandamus under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to compel the Solicitor-General to institute quo warranto proceedings. The core of his argument was that the Solicitor-General had a mandatory duty to file such proceedings due to the alleged violations of the Corporation Law by "Colegio de San Jose." However, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the duty to institute quo warranto proceedings involves the exercise of discretion and that mandamus cannot be used to control or review such discretion, absent a manifest abuse thereof.
Issue(s)
Whether a writ of mandamus can compel the Solicitor-General to institute quo warranto proceedings. Whether the Solicitor-General's discretion in instituting quo warranto proceedings can be controlled by mandamus.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the demurrer was properly sustained. The petition for mandamus was dismissed, and the costs were against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a writ of mandamus can compel the Solicitor-General to institute quo warranto proceedings: The Court held that the duty of the Solicitor-General to institute quo warranto proceedings, as provided in Section 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure, involves the exercise of discretion. This discretion is evident because the institution of such action is expressly conditioned upon whether the Solicitor-General has good reason to believe that the case specified in the relevant sections can be established by proof. It is a well-settled rule that a writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the discretion exercised by an officer vested with such power by law. Therefore, mandamus cannot be used to compel the Solicitor-General to initiate the proceedings. On the issue of whether the Solicitor-General's discretion can be controlled by mandamus: The Court reiterated that while mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in a particular way. The rule allows for departure only in cases of manifest abuse of discretion, where the acts complained of are whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary. However, the facts presented in this case did not warrant such a departure from the general rule. The Court found no evidence of manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the Solicitor-General in his decision not to institute the quo warranto proceedings.
Main Doctrine
A writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the discretion exercised by an officer vested upon him by law, except in cases of manifest abuse of discretion.