Taroma v. Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originates from a land registration proceeding (Registration Case No. 287; G.L.R.O. Record No. 52007) where the petitioner, Timoteo Taroma, received an adverse decision from the respondent judge. The core dispute revolves around whether Taroma's subsequent appeal was filed within the legally prescribed thirty-day period. 2. Procedural History: Following the adverse decision in the land registration case, Taroma filed a motion for a new trial on May 3, 1938, having received the decision on April 5, 1938. This motion was denied, and Taroma was notified of the denial on May 18, 1938. Subsequently, Taroma filed his bill of exceptions on May 21, 1938. The respondent judge refused to accept this bill of exceptions, deeming it filed one day beyond the thirty-day limit. 3. The Petition: Taroma initiated these mandamus proceedings to compel the respondent judge to accept his bill of exceptions and allow his appeal. The petition hinges on the calculation of the appeal period, with Taroma arguing that the time taken by the court to consider his motion for a new trial should be excluded, thereby rendering his appeal timely. The respondent judge, conversely, insists on a strict computation of days, which would place the filing outside the statutory period.
Issue(s)
Whether the time consumed by a trial court in considering and resolving a motion for new trial should be excluded from the thirty-day period prescribed for perfecting an appeal in land registration cases.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus is granted. The respondent judge is ordered to immediately approve, certify, and forward the bill of exceptions to the Court of Appeals.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner filed his bill of exceptions within the legal period by applying the 'Rule of Exclusion' for judicial deliberation. The Court emphasized that while Section 4 of Act No. 190 provides the general rule for computing time by excluding the first and including the last day, it should not be applied with 'rigorous technicality' to the prejudice of an appellant when the delay is caused by the court. Applying Paez v. Berenguer (6 Phil. 521) and its progeny, the Court noted that from April 5 to May 3, exactly twenty-eight days had elapsed when excluding the first day. The clock then stopped upon the filing of the motion on May 3. The time from May 3 to May 18, when the petitioner was notified of the denial, is entirely excluded because it is not within the petitioner's power to hasten the court's resolution. From May 18 to May 21, only three additional days passed, bringing the total to thirty days. The Court reasoned that there is no logic in excluding a date only to include it later, and thus, the petitioner's filing on May 21 was exactly on the thirtieth day.
Main Doctrine
The time consumed by the court in deciding a motion for new trial should be excluded in computing the period for perfecting an appeal, as this period is not within the control of the party seeking to appeal.