Marcos v. Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a charge of murder against Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Quirino Lizardo, Ferdinand Marcos, and an unidentified individual. The information alleges that on the night of September 20, 1935, in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the accused, acting in conspiracy and armed with firearms, intentionally shot and killed Julio Nalundasan, the representative-elect for the second district of Ilocos Norte. The crime was allegedly committed with treachery, evident premeditation, and intent to kill, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and the offense being perpetrated in the deceased's home. 2. Procedural History: Following the filing of the murder information on December 7, 1938, the respondent judge issued arrest warrants after examining prosecution witnesses Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio. The judge deemed the crime capital and denied bail, ordering the accused detained. The accused, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo, subsequently filed motions for admission to bail. These motions were heard, and the defense requested the prosecution present evidence to justify denying bail. The prosecution refused, and the judge sustained this position. On December 29, 1938, the respondent judge denied the bail motions for Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo, citing the capital nature of the offense and strong evidence of guilt. Ferdinand Marcos was later admitted to bail due to his age and assurances. 3. The Petition: This case comes before the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The petitioners, Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo, seek to set aside the respondent judge's order denying their admission to bail. The core legal question is whether the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused are not entitled to bail in a capital offense case, or on the accused to prove their right to bail. The petitioners argue that the prosecution should bear this burden, as bail is the rule and denial is the exception. They contend the judge erred in denying bail without the prosecution presenting evidence, especially since the initial evidence was taken ex parte.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo are entitled to be admitted to bail before conviction. Whether the burden of proof lies on the prosecution or the accused to establish that the accused is not entitled to bail when charged with a capital offense. Whether the investigation conducted by the respondent judge prior to issuing the warrant of arrest can be considered as establishing evident proof of guilt and a strong presumption of guilt for the purpose of denying bail.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the order denying bail to the petitioners, and ordered the respondent judge to set the bail petitions for hearing. At this hearing, the prosecution must prove that the accused are not entitled to bail because they are charged with a capital offense, the proof is evident, and the presumption of guilt is strong. The accused may then rebut this evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
On the entitlement to bail and the burden of proof: The Court reiterated that under Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 16 of the Constitution and Section 63 of General Orders No. 58, all persons are bailable before conviction, except those charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong or the presumption of guilt is strong. The Court held that when a person accused of a capital offense asks to be admitted to bail before conviction, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to show that the accused is not bailable. This is because the rule is that accused persons are bailable, and the exception (not being bailable) must be proven by the party invoking it. The filing of an information does not, in this jurisdiction, destroy the presumption of innocence. The Court distinguished the Philippine system from that of the United States, where grand jury indictments carry a stronger presumption of guilt due to the indictment process. On the preliminary investigation and its effect on bail: The Court disagreed with the contention that the investigation conducted by the respondent judge prior to issuing the warrant of arrest established evident proof of guilt and a strong presumption of guilt for the purpose of denying bail. The Court emphasized that such testimony was taken in the absence of the accused, who had no opportunity to be present or cross-examine the witnesses. While acknowledging prior rulings that a judge's investigation can serve as both summary and preliminary investigation, the Court clarified that the hearing required for bail under Section 66 of General Orders No. 58 is distinct from a preliminary investigation. For the evidence adduced during the initial investigation to be used against the accused in a bail hearing, the accused must have been summoned, afforded an opportunity to be present, and to cross-examine the witnesses. Furthermore, the prosecution did not offer or reproduce this evidence at the bail hearing, and the accused explicitly denied the accusations and rebutted the witnesses' testimony in their sworn statements. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence to demonstrate that the accused were not entitled to bail. On the nature of the petition: The Court found that certiorari was the proper remedy because the respondent judge exceeded the discretion conferred upon him by law in denying bail without requiring the prosecution to prove that the accused fell within the exception to the right to bail. Prohibition was deemed inappropriate as there was no allegation or ground to invoke it.
Main Doctrine
In cases where the accused is charged with a capital offense, the burden of proof to show that the accused is not bailable lies on the prosecution, not on the accused, before conviction.