Sotelo v. Dizon
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of a cinematograph business located in the Savory Theatre. Harrie S. Everett initiated a civil action to recover this business, its equipment, and existing funds, alleging it was transferred by Lazarus Joseph to the partnership Joseph Brothers, and subsequently to the petitioner, Ramon Sotelo. 2. Procedural History: Everett filed a civil case (No. 53411) in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Lazarus Joseph. After amending his complaint to include Joseph Brothers and its partners, Everett requested the appointment of a receiver. The court appointed R. Marino Corpus as receiver on December 16, 1938. When the receiver attempted to take possession, petitioner Ramon Sotelo claimed ownership by purchase from Joseph Brothers on December 15, 1938. Everett filed a supplementary complaint, and the court reiterated the receivership order on January 3, 1939. On January 5, 1939, the court ordered the sheriff to place the receiver in possession, which led to Sotelo filing this petition for certiorari on January 6, 1939, after being served with the supplementary complaint and the order for execution. 3. The Petition: Ramon Sotelo filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the legality of the respondent judge's order dated January 5, 1939, which directed the sheriff to place the receiver in possession of the cinematograph business. Sotelo argued that the order was illegal because no action was pending against him at the time and he had not been duly served with the supplementary complaint. The Supreme Court found no merit in these contentions, holding that the action was commenced upon the filing of the complaint and that the judge had jurisdiction to issue the contested orders.
Issue(s)
Whether the order of January 5, 1939, directing the sheriff to place the receiver in possession of the properties, was illegal. Whether the petitioner was duly served with the supplementary complaint when the order of January 5, 1939, was issued.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is denied. The preliminary injunction issued in this case is set aside. The petitioner is answerable for damages caused to the respondent Everett.
Ratio Decidendi
On the legality of the order of January 5, 1939: The Court found the petitioner's contention that no action was pending against him to be unjustified. The supplementary complaint had been admitted by the court on January 3, 1939, establishing that an action was indeed pending against the petitioner when the order of January 5, 1939, was issued. Therefore, the respondent judge had jurisdiction to issue the order. On whether the petitioner was duly served: The Court held that the petitioner's argument that he was not duly served with the supplementary complaint when the order of January 5, 1939, was issued, as summons only occurred on January 6, 1939, was without merit. Citing Section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court explained that a civil action is legally commenced from the date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the clerk of the Court of First Instance, without regard to the issuance and service of summons. This interpretation aligns with the Supreme Court of California's construction of a similar provision. Consequently, the action was deemed commenced against the petitioner on January 3, 1939, when the supplementary complaint was admitted, even before the summons was served on January 6, 1939. The respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction and discretion in issuing the orders.
Main Doctrine
A civil action is deemed legally commenced from the date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the clerk of the Court of First Instance, irrespective of the issuance and service of summons. A judge has jurisdiction to issue orders for the appointment and placement of a receiver when an action is properly commenced.