Marcos v. Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioners, Mariano Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo, were charged with the grave crime of murder in criminal case No. 7447 before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, for the killing of Julio Nalundasan. The information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna, who was specially designated for the case. 2. Procedural History: Upon the filing of the information, the respondent judge examined witnesses under oath and, finding probable cause, issued arrest warrants. The petitioners were arrested and subsequently sought bail, leading to a prior petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 46490) which mandated a trial to determine bail eligibility. After posting bail, the petitioners repeatedly demanded a preliminary investigation, which the respondent judge denied, asserting that the initial examination under General Orders No. 58 constituted a sufficient preliminary investigation. The case was then set for trial on the merits. During the trial, after pleading not guilty and securing separate trials, the petitioners again demanded a preliminary investigation for the fifth time, which was again denied, prompting the current petition. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to set aside the resolution denying their repeated demands for a preliminary investigation. They contend that the investigation conducted by the respondent judge under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, and the subsequent proceedings, did not satisfy the requirements of a preliminary investigation as defined by Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627. They argue that they are still entitled to a proper preliminary investigation before proceeding to trial on the merits.
Issue(s)
Whether a Judge of the Court of First Instance, conducting an investigation under Sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, is required to conduct a second, separate preliminary investigation following the procedure prescribed for Justices of the Peace in Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627.
Ruling
The motion for reconsideration is denied, and the resolution of March 13, 1939, is adhered to. The petitioners are not entitled to the preliminary investigation prayed for because it was already granted when the respondent judge conducted the summary investigation under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were not entitled to a second preliminary investigation because the investigation conducted by the respondent judge under Sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58 already satisfied the legal requirements. The Court explained that in the Philippine jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation is a statutory right, and its origin is not the Constitution; however, its omission is a grave irregularity violating the Due Process of Law clause. Applying the established rule from People vs. Solon, the Court held that when a Judge of First Instance conducts such an investigation, it serves as both the summary examination for the arrest and the preliminary investigation proper. The Court noted that the more elaborate procedures in Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627 were designed to remedy the low qualifications of Justices of the Peace at the time, but were not intended to limit the inherent powers of CFI judges. To interpret the law as requiring CFI judges to follow the Justice of the Peace procedure would render Sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58 superfluous. The Court further clarified that its previous ruling in People vs. Red did not abandon the Solon doctrine but merely addressed the waiver of summary examinations. Therefore, the respondent judge did not err in proceeding to trial, as the petitioners had already been granted the investigation to which they were legally entitled.
Main Doctrine
The preliminary investigation conducted by a judge of first instance under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, which includes both the summary examination before arrest and the preliminary investigation proper, satisfies the statutory right to a preliminary investigation, and is not superseded by the more detailed procedures outlined in Acts Nos. 194, 1450, and 1627, which are primarily intended for justices of the peace and municipal judges.