People v. Llanes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Vicente Llanes and Ramon Torlao, along with Jose Garin and Jose Espinosa, were accused of violating Article 465 in relation to Article 2639 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387. They were charged with falsifying election returns by certifying that Jose Ma. Veloso received 254 votes and Carlos Tan received 22 votes for National Assembly Deputy in the September 17, 1935 elections in Calubian, Leyte. The actual votes, as determined by recount commissioners appointed by the Electoral Commission, were 212 for Veloso and 76 for Tan. Procedural History: The trial court found Vicente Llanes and Ramon Torlao guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment, a fine, subsidiary imprisonment, costs, and disqualification from public office. Jose Garin and Jose Espinosa were acquitted. Llanes and Torlao appealed. The Petition: The appellants contended that the trial court erred in not declaring the offense prescribed, in admitting certain exhibits as evidence, and in finding them guilty and imposing the penalties.
Issue(s)
Whether the offense charged has prescribed. Whether the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits B, C, C-1, C-2, D, and D-1 as evidence. Whether the appellants were correctly found guilty and sentenced.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appeal was dismissed, and the sentence was confirmed with costs against the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the offense was committed on September 17, 1935, and the complaint was filed on September 3, 1936. The arrest warrant was issued on October 9, 1936. The recount by the Electoral Commission concluded on February 18, 1936, which is considered the date of discovery of the alterations in the absence of proof of the final decision date in the protest. The Court applied Article 2660 ½ of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233, which states that if the discovery of the offense arises from election protest proceedings, the prescriptive period begins from the termination of said proceedings. Even applying the more favorable provision for the appellants (Section 2660 ½ (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233, which states the action commences from the date the competent court issues the warrant of arrest), the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed. Counting from the discovery on February 18, 1936, to the issuance of the arrest warrant on October 9, 1936, less than one year had passed. Therefore, the defense of prescription was unfounded. On the admissibility of exhibits: The Court found no error in the admission of Exhibits B, C, C-1, C-2, D, and D-1. Exhibit B was a certified copy of the report by the recount commissioners detailing the exact votes received by Veloso and Tan. The remaining exhibits were the ballots and their envelopes. These documents were identified and were official documents, properly admitted as evidence for the prosecution. On the guilt and sentence: The Court found that the facts presented were not contradicted or disproven, especially since the appellants waived their right to testify. The offense committed by the appellants falls under Article 2639 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, which was not modified by Commonwealth Act No. 233. The penalty imposed by the trial court was in accordance with the law.
Main Doctrine
The prescription period for election offenses, when discovery arises from election protest proceedings, commences from the termination of said proceedings, not from the commission of the offense or issuance of arrest warrant, especially when the applicable law provides for a more favorable computation for the accused.