Lim Bonfing y Hnos., Inc. v. Rodriguez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The plaintiff, Lim Bonfing y Hnos., Inc., filed a complaint against the defendant, Teodorico Rodriguez, for the recovery of a debt arising from advances made for sugar purchases. The defendant acknowledged a debt of P9,150.00 on February 16, 1932, with 12% annual interest, payable in three installments, the last due in 1934. The defendant failed to pay any installments despite repeated demands. Procedural History: The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendant was disposing of his properties to defraud creditors, including the plaintiff, and sought a preliminary attachment. The plaintiff's manager, Lim Yok Su, submitted an oath stating the allegations were true to the best of his knowledge and belief. The lower court ordered the lifting of the preliminary attachment, finding that the manager's oath did not indicate personal knowledge of the facts. The defendant also argued that a compromise agreement constituted a novation of the contract. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed the lower court's order lifting the preliminary attachment.
Issue(s)
Whether the oath of the corporate manager, stating that the allegations in the complaint are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, sufficiently indicates personal knowledge of the facts for the issuance of a preliminary attachment. Whether the compromise agreement between the parties constituted a novation of the original obligation.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order, lifting the preliminary attachment. The Court found the manager's oath sufficient and held that the compromise agreement did not constitute a novation of the obligation.
Ratio Decidendi
On the sufficiency of the oath for preliminary attachment: The Court found the lower court's conclusion erroneous. The oath of the corporate manager, Lim Yok Su, stated, "That the statements contained in the foregoing complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." The Court emphasized that the phrase "to the best of my knowledge and belief" is distinct from "to the best of my information." This phrasing, particularly the inclusion of "my knowledge," indicates that the affiant has a basis for believing the statements to be true, which is sufficient for the purpose of an attachment. The Court found nothing in the oath that supported the conclusion of a lack of personal knowledge. The manager's affirmation of the defendant's intent to defraud creditors, a key element for attachment, was directly stated within the scope of his knowledge and belief. On whether the compromise agreement constituted a novation: The Court held that the proposition that the compromise agreement constituted a novation was untenable. The obligation of the defendant to pay the balance of his accounts with the plaintiff remained the same; it did not change in any way. What was modified by the agreement of the parties was merely the manner in which the debt was to be paid, not the obligation itself, which was the debt. The Court cited Inchausti y Cia. contra Yulo to support the principle that a change in the mode of payment does not constitute a novation of the obligation itself. Therefore, the original obligation subsisted, and the plaintiff was still entitled to pursue remedies based on it, including seeking an attachment.
Main Doctrine
The oath of a corporate officer in an application for a preliminary injunction or attachment, stating that the allegations are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, is sufficient to establish personal knowledge of the facts alleged, especially when the oath explicitly states "to the best of my knowledge" and not merely "to the best of my information."