People v. Ocampo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Luis Ocampo was charged with concubinage with Igmedia Refe. Their illicit relations began in 1937. In September 1937, they went to Naga and lived together as husband and wife, attending social events. In October 1937, they stayed together as husband and wife in Tiwi, Albay, for seven days and nights, sharing a room. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Albay found petitioner guilty of concubinage and sentenced him accordingly. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. The Petition: Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the legal question of whether his conduct constituted concubinage under the law.
Issue(s)
Whether the conduct of the petitioner with Igmedia Refe constituted cohabitation sufficient to establish the crime of concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether a letter sent by the complainant constituted consent or condonation of the illicit relations.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the petitioner was guilty of concubinage.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the conduct constituted cohabitation sufficient to establish concubinage: The Court held that the petitioner's conduct with Igmedia Refe went beyond isolated interviews for unlawful intercourse. They "dwelt together as husband and wife" in Naga, where they were seen attending shows and dances, indicating a sustained assumption of the conjugal relation. Furthermore, their stay in Tiwi, Albay, where they "dwelt together as husband and wife" for seven days and nights, sharing a room, was deemed sufficient to constitute cohabitation within the meaning of Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court emphasized that "cohabit" means to dwell together in the manner of husband and wife for some period of time, distinguishing it from mere transient encounters. The extent of such association is a question of fact for the court's appreciation, and in this case, the association was found to be sufficient to constitute cohabitation, even without direct proof of actual sexual intercourse. The Court relied on the definition of cohabitation as dwelling together in the manner of husband and wife for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse, citing People vs. Pitoc. On whether the letter constituted consent or condonation: The Court noted that the petitioner argued that a letter sent by the complainant constituted consent and condonation under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the trial court had already construed the letter, under the facts and circumstances, as not constituting consent or condonation. The Court of Appeals did not reverse this finding. At the stage of the Supreme Court's review, it could not re-examine findings of fact, thus upholding the lower courts' interpretation of the letter.
Main Doctrine
Cohabitation, as an element of concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, requires dwelling together in the manner of husband and wife for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful intercourse. The extent of such association constituting cohabitation is a question of fact for the court's appreciation.