People v. Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused, Jesus de la Cruz y Gingo, was charged with theft. The value of the stolen property was P3.95. The information alleged that this was the fifth offense of the accused against property, with a prior conviction for the same offense on June 19, 1931, the penalty for which was extinguished only on October 3, 1939, almost a year before the commission of the current offense. Procedural History: The lower court imposed a principal penalty of 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor for theft and an additional penalty of 12 years of reclusion temporal for habitual delinquency. The Petition: The accused appealed the sentence, believing he did not deserve the penalties imposed. The counsel de oficio recommended the confirmation of the sentence but suggested a reduction of penalties if justice and equity would permit.
Issue(s)
Whether the principal penalty for theft was correctly imposed considering the presence of both an aggravating and a mitigating circumstance. Whether the additional penalty for habitual delinquency was correctly computed under the principle of non bis in idem.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the sentence. The principal penalty of 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor was affirmed. The additional penalty for habitual delinquency was modified to conform to the minimum prescribed by law, considering the mitigating circumstance of confession.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the principal penalty was appropriate under Article 309, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). For theft of property valued at P3.95, the law prescribes the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees. Because there was one aggravating circumstance of recidivism (reincidencia) and one mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession (confesion), these circumstances should ordinarily offset each other. However, the trial court imposed 2 months and 1 day, which is the minimum of the medium degree. The Supreme Court found this to be legally sound as it fell within the correct range prescribed for the offense. The Court emphasized that the principal penalty must reflect the specific degree dictated by the interplay of these modifying circumstances. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the trial court erred in the computation of the additional penalty for habitual delinquency. For a fifth conviction, Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) mandates an additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). Since the accused confessed to the crime, the penalty should have been applied in its minimum period (10 years and 1 day to 11 years, 6 months, and 20 days). The Court reasoned that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism could not be used to 'compensate' or offset the mitigating circumstance of confession in this context, because that specific recidivism had already been factored into the calculation of the principal penalty. Citing Pueblo v. De Jesus y Javier, the Court invoked the axiom of 'non bis in idem' to prevent the double-counting of the recidivism. Consequently, the Court fixed the additional penalty at 11 years to bring it within the correct legal range.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court modified the sentence imposed by the lower court, adjusting the additional penalty for habitual delinquency to conform to the minimum prescribed by law, while affirming the principal penalty for theft, considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and the mitigating circumstance of confession.