Tanega v. Nazareno
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The plaintiff initiated a civil suit against the defendant in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite to recover possession of a parcel of land. During the proceedings, the CFI ordered a resurvey of the land, with the understanding that the plaintiff would advance the surveyor's expenses, which would later be taxed as costs against the losing party upon final decision. Procedural History: The CFI rendered a judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint without any specific pronouncement regarding costs. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the CFI's judgment, ruling in favor of the plaintiff and awarding "costs against the appellee." The Appeal: Upon the return of the case to the CFI, the plaintiff submitted a bill of costs totaling P314.77, which included costs from both the CA and the CFI, as well as the P90 advanced for the resurvey. The defendant objected to this taxation. The clerk of the CFI taxed the costs at P224.96, incorporating the CA costs and the resurvey expenses. The defendant appealed this taxation to the CFI, which affirmed the clerk's assessment. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA's award of costs only pertained to the costs incurred in the CA.
Issue(s)
Whether the costs awarded by the Court of Appeals, in the absence of specific qualification, include the costs incurred in the Court of First Instance. Whether expenses advanced by the plaintiff for a court-ordered resurvey, which were to be taxed as costs against the losing party, should be included in the final award of costs.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court sustaining the taxation of costs. The Court held that the costs awarded by the Court of Appeals, in the absence of any qualification, should be construed to mean all costs of suit from its commencement to its termination, including those incurred in the Court of First Instance.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that costs ordinarily follow the result of the suit, as provided by Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 487 of Act No. 190). Unless the court, for special reasons, adjudges otherwise, the prevailing party is entitled to costs as a matter of course. In this case, the plaintiff was the prevailing party in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals expressly awarded costs against the appellee. Therefore, the phrase "with costs" in the appellate court's decision is construed to mean all costs made in both the appellate court and the court below. This interpretation is supported by legal authorities, which state that in the absence of qualification, "with costs" in an order of reversal or affirmance in the court of appeals will be construed to mean all costs made in both the appellate court and the court below. The Court cited 15 Corpus Juris 260 and 20 Corpus Juris Secundum 590 to support this interpretation. The award of costs by the Court of Appeals was therefore meant to encompass all costs from the inception of the case. On Issue 2: The Court implicitly affirmed the inclusion of the P90 advanced by the plaintiff for the resurvey as part of the taxable costs. The trial court's order, which was sustained on appeal, had included this amount in the taxed costs. The agreement between the parties stipulated that such expenses would be advanced by the plaintiff and "shall be taxed as costs which shall be paid by the losing party." Since the plaintiff ultimately prevailed, these advanced expenses, having been properly taxed by the clerk and affirmed by the court, were correctly included in the total costs awarded to the plaintiff.
Main Doctrine
In Philippine jurisprudence, costs ordinarily follow the result of the suit, meaning the prevailing party is entitled to recover their expenses as a matter of course. When an appellate court reverses a trial court's decision and awards costs against the appellee, such an award is generally construed to include all costs incurred from the commencement of the action to its termination, encompassing both the appellate court's costs and the lower court's costs, unless the appellate court explicitly qualifies or limits the award.