Atienza v. Castillo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Lope Atienza filed a complaint against Maximino Castillo, Eulogia Giga, and Juana Castillo for damages amounting to P1,836. The damages were allegedly incurred due to the breach of an agreement by Maximino Castillo and Eulogia Giga that their daughter, Juana Castillo, would marry the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to prove the existence of this alleged agreement and the services he rendered in consideration thereof through testimonial evidence. Procedural History: The defendants objected to the presentation of testimonial evidence, citing Article 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits oral proof of agreements made in consideration of marriage. The trial court sustained the objection. As the plaintiff could not present documentary proof, the case was dismissed upon motion of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his case, arguing that the trial court erred in sustaining the defendants' objection to testimonial evidence and in dismissing the case.
Issue(s)
Whether testimonial evidence is admissible to prove an alleged agreement in consideration of marriage, where the marriage was to take place more than one year after the agreement was made. Whether the defendants are barred from invoking the Statute of Frauds because they did not raise it as a defense in their answer.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the dismissal of the case. The Court ruled that the agreement, by its terms, was not to be performed within one year and thus required documentary proof under the Statute of Frauds. The defendants were not precluded from invoking the Statute of Frauds as they only became aware of the nature of the plaintiff's evidence during the trial.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of testimonial evidence for agreements in consideration of marriage not to be performed within one year: The Court held that the action presented by the plaintiff was not to compel Juana Castillo to fulfill a promise of marriage, but to claim damages for alleged services rendered in consideration of a promise of marriage made by the defendants. This case falls within the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds. Specifically, the alleged agreement for marriage was made in May 1934, with the marriage to take place in 1938 when Juana Castillo turned eighteen. According to the Statute of Frauds, any contract that, by its terms, is not to be performed within one year from the date of its making must be proven by documentary evidence. Since the alleged agreement was to be performed four years after its making, it should have been proven by documentary, not testimonial, evidence. The trial court correctly sustained the objection to testimonial proof. On the defendants' invocation of the Statute of Frauds: The Court found that the defendants were not precluded from invoking the Statute of Frauds. They only became aware during the trial in the lower court that the alleged marriage agreement, which formed the basis of the plaintiff's claim for damages, was not in writing. The defendants could not have anticipated the evidence the plaintiff would present, especially since the complaint did not indicate whether the agreement was in writing or not. The presumption, given the nature of such agreements under the Statute of Frauds, is that it should be in writing, and it is a general rule that the ordinary course of any proceeding or agreement is presumed. Therefore, the defendants' failure to plead the Statute of Frauds in their answer did not bar them from raising it when the plaintiff attempted to prove the agreement through inadmissible oral testimony.
Main Doctrine
Agreements made in consideration of marriage, which by their terms are not to be performed within one year from the date of the making thereof, are unenforceable unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Oral evidence is inadmissible to prove such agreements.