Buck v. De la Rosa
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioner, Hammon H. Buck, is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Batangas, covered by original certificates of title Nos. 28658 and 28659. On dates between December 7, 1938, and February 10, 1939, other parties filed petitions to review the decrees issued in favor of the petitioner for these lands, and a notice of lis pendens was recorded. 2. Procedural History: Alleging that the petitions for review were malicious and false, and that the notice of lis pendens prevented him from disposing of his properties, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the respondents. This case, civil case No. 3553, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. After demurrers were overruled and answers filed, the respondent judge dismissed the case on December 19, 1940, deeming it premature as the petitions for review had not yet been concluded. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to annul the order of dismissal issued by the respondent judge. He argues that the judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the damages case. The Supreme Court, however, finds that certiorari is not the proper remedy, as the judge acted within his jurisdiction and the dismissal order was appealable. The Court also notes that the petitioner's own admission suggests the action was premature, and that holding the case in abeyance was discretionary, not mandatory.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the damage suit as premature. Whether the remedy of certiorari is appropriate when the order of dismissal is subject to appeal.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction and did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the action for damages. Furthermore, the order of dismissal was appealable, and certiorari cannot be used to supplant the remedy of appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction and did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. The damage suit was explicitly based on the contention that the respondents' petitions for review were false and malicious; however, because those petitions were still pending trial, the truth or falsity of the claims had not yet been determined. While the trial court had the discretion to hold the damage suit in abeyance, its decision to dismiss it was not an abuse of discretion, particularly because the Rules of Court discourage the clogging of dockets with dormant cases. The Court noted that the petitioner 'pulled the trigger too soon' by initiating the damage suit before the conclusion of the underlying land registration proceedings. On Issue 2: Certiorari does not lie in this case because the order of dismissal was an appealable order. The petitioner's counsel admitted during oral arguments that an appeal was available. The Court reiterated the long-standing rule that although an appeal may not be as speedy as the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the latter cannot be used as a substitute for the former. The existence of the right to appeal precludes the use of certiorari to challenge a trial court's order issued within its jurisdiction.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to annul an order of dismissal of a civil case when such order is appealable. The Court reasoned that the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction in dismissing the case for prematurity, and even if there was an error in judgment, the proper recourse would have been an appeal, not certiorari, as an appeal provides a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.