Gardiner v. Magsalin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information was filed charging Catalino Fernandez and five coaccused with conspiracy to kill Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premeditation. Procedural History: Upon arraignment, Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty, while his coaccused pleaded not guilty. During the trial of the coaccused, the fiscal called Fernandez as a witness to testify on the alleged conspiracy. The respondent judge disallowed Fernandez's testimony against his coaccused, citing Section 12, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of conspiracy by evidence other than the act or declaration of a conspirator. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit the testimony of Catalino Fernandez.
Issue(s)
Whether the testimony of an accused who pleaded guilty is admissible against his coaccused to prove conspiracy. Whether Section 12, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court prohibits the admission of the testimony of a conspirator against his co-conspirators before the conspiracy is independently proven.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The respondent judge is ordered to admit the testimony of Catalino Fernandez.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of testimony of a co-accused: The Court clarified that Section 12, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to the admission by a conspirator, refers specifically to extrajudicial acts or declarations of a conspirator. It does not apply to the testimony given in court by a co-accused, even if that co-accused is also a conspirator. The testimony of a witness, including a co-accused who has pleaded guilty, is considered direct evidence of the facts to which they testify. Such testimony is competent to establish the facts, irrespective of whether the conspiracy has been independently proven. The rule cited by the respondent judge is an exception to the res inter alios rule, which generally states that an act or declaration cannot affect a stranger. However, this exception is limited to extrajudicial statements. On the interpretation of Section 12, Rule 123: The Court emphasized that Section 12, Rule 123 is a re-enactment of a long-standing rule of evidence. Its well-settled meaning in jurisprudence pertains to extrajudicial declarations, not to direct testimony given in court. The rule is designed to prevent the admission of statements made outside of the judicial proceeding that implicate co-conspirators, unless the conspiracy itself is first established by independent evidence. However, when a conspirator testifies in court, they are providing direct evidence of facts, and their testimony is subject to the rules of evidence concerning witness competency and credibility, not the specific rule on extrajudicial declarations of conspirators. The Court cited jurisprudence from California and Corpus Juris Secundum to support this interpretation, highlighting that evidence adduced in court by coconspirators as witnesses are not declarations but direct testimony to the facts. Therefore, the respondent judge's interpretation that the conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the testimony of Fernandez was erroneous.
Main Doctrine
The testimony of a co-accused who pleaded guilty is admissible as direct evidence against his co-accused, and is not subject to the rule prohibiting the admission of extrajudicial declarations of a conspirator against his co-conspirators until the conspiracy is proven by independent evidence.