Sawit v. Rodas
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a petition filed by Eugenio Sawit, et al. (petitioners) to review a decree of registration issued in favor of Ysidra Cojuangco (respondent) for lot 84. The petitioners alleged that the decree was obtained through fraud. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners filed their petition to review the decree in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija on March 21, 1938. After considering the pleadings and evidence, Judge Concepcion denied the petition on January 31, 1941. The petitioners' attorney was notified on February 17, 1941, and subsequently filed two motions: a motion for reconsideration, heard on March 10, 1941, and a motion for new trial, heard on March 17, 1941. The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 10, 1941. The status of the motion for new trial is disputed, with the petitioners claiming no order was issued and the respondents asserting it was denied on March 17, 1941. On April 8, 1941, Ysidra Cojuangco moved to declare the January 31, 1941 order final, which was granted by respondent judge Sotero Rodas on April 17, 1941. Reconsideration of this order was denied. 3. The Petition: The petitioners instituted the present action for certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify the April 17, 1941 order and to reopen the case to allow them to present evidence of ownership. They also prayed for the respondent judge to be ordered to refrain from further proceedings. The Supreme Court noted that the primary objective appeared to be the revision of the January 31, 1941 order, which is not permissible via certiorari. The Court also found the procedural steps taken by the petitioners, including filing simultaneous motions for reconsideration and new trial for the same purpose, to be superfluous and improper, leading to the denial of the writ and dismissal of the petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court can review the order of January 31, 1941, denying the petition for review, through a petition for certiorari. Whether the filing of two separate motions, one for reconsideration and another for new trial, for the same purpose, is permissible and affects the finality of the order. Whether an order declaring a previous order final is necessary or affects the finality of the order.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is denied, and the case is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari to review the order of January 31, 1941: The Supreme Court held that a petition for certiorari cannot be used to supplant or convert the ordinary remedy of appeal. The petitioners' principal objective was to have the order of January 31, 1941, denying their petition for review, revised and reversed. This could only be done through an appeal, not certiorari. Even if the order of April 17, 1941, declaring the January 31, 1941 order final, did not exist, certiorari would not be the proper remedy to review the merits of the January 31, 1941 order. If the order had become final, it could not be reviewed on certiorari. If it was still appealable, then appeal was the proper remedy. Therefore, the primary objective of the petitioners could not prosper. On the effect of filing two separate motions: The Court found it an error for counsel to file two separate motions, one for reconsideration and another for new trial, on the same day for practically the same purpose and setting them for hearing on different dates. The Court stated that lawyers should not indulge in superfluities and should realize that the court's time is valuable. The Rules of Court do not permit the filing of a second motion for new trial unless on a ground not existing when the first motion was made. In this case, the grounds were substantially the same, and there was no trial on the petition to revise the decree, making a motion for new trial illogical. The motion for reconsideration was the proper remedy, and once denied, the petitioners had exhausted their remedies in the trial court. On the necessity of an order declaring an order final: The Court clarified that an order or decision becomes final by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. The order of January 31, 1941, became final ipso jure after thirty days from the date the parties were notified thereof, deducting the period from the presentation of the motion for reconsideration to the notice of its denial. The so-called motion for new trial, being superfluous and improper, produced no legal effect whatsoever. Therefore, the motion filed by respondent Ysidra Cojuangco asking the court to declare its previous order final, and the subsequent order of the respondent judge granting it, were unnecessary and did not affect the finality of the January 31, 1941 order.
Main Doctrine
The filing of two separate motions, one for reconsideration and another for new trial, for substantially the same purpose and on the same grounds, is considered a superfluous act and an imposition upon the court's time. A motion for new trial is not permissible if it is based on grounds already raised in a prior motion for reconsideration, unless the grounds for the second motion did not exist at the time the first motion was made. Furthermore, an order becomes final by operation of law after the period for appeal has lapsed, and a subsequent judicial declaration to that effect is unnecessary and does not extend the period for appeal.