Laguna v. Levantino
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Justo Laguna died intestate, survived by his children Bonifacio and Vivencia, and descendants of a predeceased son. Bonifacio died intestate, survived by his wife Ambrosia Levantino. Subsequently, Ambrosia Levantino, Vivencia Laguna, and Esteban Laguna Fabie (heir of a predeceased son of Justo) executed two deeds of partition. The first deed, Exhibit A, divided properties of Justo Laguna. The second deed, Exhibit B, divided properties of Bonifacio Laguna. Two parcels of land, which were the exclusive property of Justo Laguna, were erroneously included in Exhibit B, with Vivencia Laguna believing them to be conjugal property of Bonifacio and Ambrosia. Procedural History: Six years after the execution of the deeds, Vivencia Laguna discovered the error and filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan to recover the portion of the two parcels erroneously assigned to Ambrosia Levantino. The CFI rendered judgment declaring the partition null and void and adjudging the two parcels as exclusive properties of Vivencia Laguna. Ambrosia Levantino appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the CFI judgment, holding that Bonifacio Laguna had acquired title by prescription, that Vivencia's action for rescission had prescribed, and that Vivencia was estopped by her signature on the deed of partition. The Petition: Vivencia Laguna filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the two parcels of land were acquired by Bonifacio Laguna through prescription. Whether Vivencia Laguna's action for the recovery of the parcels of land had prescribed. Whether Vivencia Laguna is estopped from impugning the validity of the deed of partition.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan is affirmed. The two parcels of land are declared the exclusive properties of Vivencia Laguna.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that Bonifacio Laguna's possession of the two parcels of land during his father Justo Laguna's lifetime was merely in the character of a trustee. The possession of a trustee is, in law, the possession of the cestui que trust and cannot be a ground for title by prescription. For a trustee's possession to be adverse, there must be an open repudiation of the trust by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust. The sole fact of Bonifacio having declared the lands in his name for tax purposes does not constitute such an unequivocal act of repudiation amounting to an ouster of his father, Justo Laguna, and therefore cannot constitute adverse possession as a basis for title by prescription. The Court cited Cortes et al. v. Oliva, Bargayo v. Camumot, and Espeidel v. Henrice. On the issue of prescription of action: The Court clarified that Vivencia Laguna's action was not one of rescission, which presupposes a valid partition, but rather one of reivindicacion, which aims to ignore a void partition. As an action for reivindicacion, it prescribes in ten years, not the six years cited by the Court of Appeals under Article 1076 of the Civil Code for rescission. The partition, with respect to Ambrosia Levantino who had no right to inherit from Justo Laguna, was legally non-existent and could be completely ignored, citing Manresa. On the issue of estoppel: The Court ruled that acquiescence through innocent mistake cannot constitute a basis for estoppel. Vivencia Laguna's signing of the deed of partition was based on an innocent mistake regarding the nature of the property, and therefore, she is not estopped from impugning its validity. The Court cited 21 C.J., 1125.
Main Doctrine
A partition made upon the erroneous assumption that certain properties were conjugal, when in fact they were exclusive property of one of the deceased, is a contract without consideration and is void. An action to recover such property is one of reivindicacion, not rescission, and prescribes in ten years.