Fojas v. Garcia
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioner, Domingo Fojas, initiated a civil action against the minor children of the deceased Ambrosia Fojas, represented by their father Leonardo Burgos, to recover P1,000. This sum was allegedly owed by the deceased mother in lieu of half of a specific lot that had passed to the minor children. The core of the dispute revolved around whether this claim had prescribed. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissed Fojas's complaint on May 10, 1943, ruling that the action had prescribed. Fojas filed two motions for reconsideration, both of which were denied by the respondent judge on June 10, 1943, and July 31, 1943. The judge reiterated the prescription of the action and suggested the claim should be pursued in special proceedings for estate distribution. Fojas then filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 1943, along with his record on appeal and appeal bond, from the original judgment and the subsequent orders denying his motions for reconsideration. The respondent judge dismissed this appeal as having been filed out of time. 3. The Petition: This case is a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the respondent judge to certify the petitioner's record on appeal. The petitioner argues that his appeal should be counted from the date he received notice of the last order denying his second motion for reconsideration, and that the appeal was timely filed considering the intervening Sunday. However, the Supreme Court found this argument untenable, as the notice of appeal explicitly covered the original judgment and subsequent orders. The Court held that the time to appeal must be counted from the date of receipt of the original judgment of dismissal, and that even with deductions for pending motions, the appeal was filed four days late.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the petitioner could appeal solely from the last order denying his motion for reconsideration, thereby excluding the original judgment from the appeal.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus is denied. The appeal was dismissed by the respondent judge as it was filed out of time.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of timely filing and the appeal from the last order: The petitioner's theory that he could appeal solely from the last order denying his second motion for reconsideration is untenable. The notice of appeal explicitly stated an appeal from the judgment of May 10, 1943, as well as from the subsequent orders denying the motions for reconsideration. It is not permissible to appeal only from the order denying a motion for reconsideration while leaving the original judgment undisturbed. The subsequent orders denying the motions for reconsideration did not set aside or substitute the original judgment; instead, they maintained it and merely adduced additional reasons to support it. Therefore, the time to appeal must be counted from the date petitioner received notice of the original judgment of dismissal, which was May 28, 1943. Even after deducting the periods during which the motions for reconsideration were pending, the record on appeal was presented four days late. The Court cited Reyes vs. Court of Appeals to emphasize the strictness of appeal periods, even when only the appeal bond was presented late. On the issue of whether the appeal could be taken solely from the last order: As established, the appeal was from the judgment and the subsequent orders. The subsequent orders denying the motions for reconsideration did not vacate or modify the original judgment of dismissal. They merely reiterated the original ruling and provided further justification. Thus, the appeal must be considered as being from the original judgment, and the reglementary period for appeal commenced upon receipt of notice of that judgment. The petitioner's attempt to isolate the appeal to the last order was legally unsound.
Main Doctrine
An appeal must be filed within the reglementary period from the judgment, and subsequent motions for reconsideration, even if denied, do not extend the period to appeal from the original judgment if the judgment itself was maintained.