Mirano v. Diaz
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a complaint for forcible entry and detainer filed by Pedro Mossesgeld Santiago and Mercedes Alonzo Mossesgeld against Mauricio Mirano. The respondents alleged that Mirano illegally deprived them of the possession of a lot and house by means of force and intimidation on May 7, 1945. Mirano, the petitioner, sought to dismiss the case, asserting that the sale of the property was null and void due to a forged power of attorney executed under duress, thus raising a question of ownership rather than mere possession. 2. Procedural History: The Municipal Court of Manila initially dismissed the forcible entry and detainer case for lack of jurisdiction, deeming the issue to be one of ownership. The respondents appealed this dismissal to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of First Instance, upon motion by the respondents and finding that the case primarily involved possession, remanded it back to the Municipal Court for trial on the merits. Mirano attempted to appeal this order of remand, but the Court of First Instance disapproved his record on appeal, ruling that the order was interlocutory and thus unappealable. 3. The Petition: At this juncture, Mirano filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. He sought to annul the order of the Court of First Instance that declared the Municipal Court had jurisdiction and remanded the case for trial. Mirano also requested that the Municipal Court be prohibited from further proceeding with the case. The Supreme Court, however, found that the Court of First Instance acted in accordance with established legal doctrine regarding forcible entry and detainer cases and interlocutory orders, leading to the dismissal of Mirano's petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in remanding the forcible entry and detainer case to the municipal court for trial on the merits. Whether the order of the Court of First Instance remanding the case was an appealable interlocutory order.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. The order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, remanding the case to the municipal court for trial on the merits, is strictly in accordance with the law and authorities.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Court of First Instance remanding the case: It is a well-established doctrine that in forcible entry and detainer cases, when dismissed by an inferior court for lack of jurisdiction and appealed to the Court of First Instance, the sole question for the CFI to determine is whether the inferior court had jurisdiction to try the case on the merits. If the CFI finds that the municipal court has jurisdiction, as correctly held in this case, it must be remanded to the said court for trial on the merits. The order of the respondent Judge of the CFI remanding the case to the municipal court for trial on the merits is strictly in accordance with the law and authorities cited, such as Rule 92 and cases like Carroll vs. Paredes, Davis vs. Director of Prisons, U.S. vs. Bernardo, and Lucido vs. Vita. Therefore, the CFI acted within its legal bounds in remanding the case. On the issue of the appealability of the order: For a petition for certiorari to prosper, it is absolutely necessary to show that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof. In the instant case, the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance acted strictly in accordance with law. The order remanding the case for trial on the merits, after determining jurisdiction, is considered interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case but merely allows the proceedings to continue. An interlocutory order is generally not appealable. The petitioner's attempt to appeal the order was correctly denied by the CFI, as it was not an appealable order. The petition for certiorari and prohibition, being completely and absolutely devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed.
Main Doctrine
An order of the Court of First Instance remanding a case to the municipal court for trial on the merits, after finding that the municipal court has jurisdiction, is in accordance with law and established doctrine, and is not subject to a petition for certiorari and prohibition.