Ong Su Han v. David
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Ong Su Han was sued for unlawful detainer by respondent Tan Eng Gee. Judgment was rendered in favor of Tan Eng Gee in the Municipal Court, and the case was appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Procedural History: On July 11, 1945, the CFI entered judgment of ouster based on a compromise agreement between the parties, stipulating that no writ of execution would issue before November 30, 1945, provided petitioner paid monthly rents, and that petitioner waived his right to appeal. Petitioner later attempted to have the decision vacated, claiming he did not authorize the compromise, but failed. A writ of execution was issued on December 20, 1945. Petitioner's certiorari proceedings in the Supreme Court were dismissed on January 9, 1946. Subsequently, on January 18, 1946, petitioner filed a motion for suspension of execution in the CFI, invoking Commonwealth Act No. 689. Respondent Judge Jose Gutierrez David denied the suspension, citing that petitioner had exhausted legal remedies and that the judgment was based on a compromise. The Petition: Petitioner filed an application for certiorari and allied remedies, arguing that the CFI Judge abused his discretion in denying the suspension of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689.
Issue(s)
Is the granting of suspension of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 mandatory or discretionary? Did the trial judge commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the suspension of execution and revoking Judge Ocampo's interlocutory order without a formal hearing?
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved. Respondent Tan Eng Gee may forthwith have his execution.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the granting of suspension of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 (CA 689) is discretionary, not mandatory. The Court reconciled Section 4, which states that the court "may, at its discretion," suspend the execution, with Section 5, which uses the phrase "shall grant" the suspension if certain conditions are met. It opined that these provisions must be construed together, their combined effect being the specification of conditions for granting relief, but not stripping the court of its inherent discretion. Therefore, even if the conditions in Sections 4 and 5 are present, the court may still, in its discretion, reject the postponement if valid reasons are shown, with any abuse of this discretion being reviewable by certiorari. The Court's interpretation recognizes the statute's intent to provide relief while preserving judicial prerogative in assessing overall circumstances. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the suspension. The Court noted that the judgment of dispossession was entered on July 11, 1945, which was more than six months prior to Ong Su Han's request for suspension under CA 689 on January 18, 1946. Citing Tiangco vs. Liboro and Judge of First Instance of Manila (75 Phil., 559), where a denial of suspension was upheld because the petitioner had "nearly six months within which to look for another dwelling house," the Court found that Ong Su Han had been afforded sufficient time. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle established in Roxas vs. Zandueta (57 Phil., 14) that a judge of first instance is not legally prevented from revoking the interlocutory order of another judge in the same litigation subsequently assigned to him for judicial action. The Court also held that Judge Gutierrez David was not required to hold a formal hearing if a reading of the record sufficiently convinced him that the suspension should be revoked or disapproved as improperly granted.
Main Doctrine
The granting of suspension of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 is discretionary, and denial thereof is not an abuse of discretion if the petitioner has had sufficient time to secure alternative dwelling, or if the judgment sought to be suspended was rendered by virtue of a compromise agreement.