Flores v. Nable

G.R. No. L-327 · 1946-08-16 · J. PARAS, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: In an ejectment case, the Municipal Court of Manila rendered a decision on August 8, 1945, in favor of Segundo Ferriols (plaintiff-appellee) and against Mariano Flores (defendant-appellant). The decision stipulated that no execution would issue until after December 31, 1945. Procedural History: On January 2, 1946, Ferriols filed a motion for execution due to Flores' failure to vacate. Flores moved to suspend execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689. The municipal court denied Flores' motion, citing that he had already been given four months and had a house returned to him by the Army in September 1945. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration and facing a sheriff's threat to enforce the judgment, Flores filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila on January 25, 1946. This petition was denied on January 26, 1946, leading to the present appeal. The Petition: Mariano Flores appealed the denial of his petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to suspend the execution of the ejectment judgment.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Whether Commonwealth Act No. 689 can be invoked to suspend the execution of a detainer case decision based on an agreement of the parties.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, holding that the respondent municipal court did not commit an abuse of discretion in refusing to suspend the execution of its decision.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether Commonwealth Act No. 689 can be invoked to suspend the execution of a detainer case decision based on an agreement of the parties: The Court stated that it does not concur with the argument that when a decision in a detainer case is based upon an agreement of the parties whereby the defendant binds himself to leave after a definite period, the latter cannot invoke the benefits conferred by Commonwealth Act No. 689. However, this did not alter the outcome of the case. On the issue of the Court of First Instance's dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition: The Court reiterated its ruling that the granting of suspensions of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 is discretionary. This discretion depends on whether the conditions specified in sections 4 and 5 of the Act are present. If these conditions are not met, the court cannot grant a postponement, provided valid reasons are shown for the denial. Furthermore, any abuse in the exercise of this discretion is reviewable by certiorari. In the instant case, the municipal court found that Mariano Flores' house was released by the Army in September 1945. This fact is a sufficient reason for not allowing any suspension of execution, as one of the requisites under section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 is that "the petitioner cannot secure another dwelling house for himself and his family." Even disregarding the period from August 8 to December 31, 1945, during which execution was agreed not to be issued, Flores had more than seven months to recondition his house or secure another. This effectively served the purpose of Commonwealth Act No. 689, which is to give the petitioner time to secure another dwelling. The Court referenced Tiangco vs. Liboro and Judge of First Instance of Manila (75 Phil., 559) where a similar suspension was denied because the petitioner already had another dwelling.

Main Doctrine

The granting of suspensions of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 is discretionary, and if the conditions specified in sections 4 and 5 are not present, the court cannot grant postponement, whenever valid reasons are shown. Any abuse in the use of that discretion is reviewable by certiorari.

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