Dimayuga v. Raymundo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Olimpia K. Vda. de Dimayuga filed an ejectment case against respondents Gaspara Raymundo and Patricio Torres for non-payment of rentals from December 1944. On April 28, 1945, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to vacate and pay rents from March 1, 1945, until they vacate. Judgment was withheld for previous rents due to moratorium. Procedural History: Before the hearing, Raymundo paid P60 to petitioner's counsel and was assured immunity, as petitioner's animosity was directed at Torres. After the judgment, Raymundo paid P45 on June 12, 1945, for April, May, and June 1945 rentals, and received a receipt. An execution was issued on June 7, 1945, ousting Torres but not Raymundo. On July 26, 1945, an alias execution was issued. Raymundo moved to quash this writ, arguing that accepting rent payments up to June 1945 constituted a renewal of the lease, rendering the judgment ineffective. The respondent judge granted the motion to quash, finding that the continued receipt of rents established a new contract. The Petition: Petitioner Dimayuga filed a special civil action to annul the order of cancellation, contending that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the writ of execution. Whether the acceptance of rent payments by the petitioner, covering the period after the judgment of eviction, constituted a renewal of the lease agreement, thereby renouncing the judgment of dispossession.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The order of the Municipal Court quashing the writ of execution is sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the writ of execution: The jurisdiction of courts to entertain motions to quash their writs of execution is unquestioned, as every court has the inherent power to correct errors of its ministerial officers and control its own process for the advancement of justice. One of the grounds for quashing an execution is that the judgment has been paid or satisfied before its issuance. The quashing of an execution rests largely in the court's discretion, to be exercised in furtherance of justice. In this case, the petitioner, instead of enforcing the order of execution, received rent payments from the respondent Raymundo that included rent for the entire month of June 1945. This act placed the petitioner in a position where she could not enforce the writ of dispossession at least until the end of June. By accepting these payments, she acted against the tenor of the judgment to dispossess Raymundo and must be deemed to have renounced it, thereby resuming her role as lessor. The court's power to quash being clear, the issue then becomes whether the Municipal Court abused its discretion. The acceptance of rent payments covering a period subsequent to the judgment of eviction, without an express agreement to renew the lease, can be interpreted as a renunciation of the judgment of dispossession. The respondent judge was not to blame for adopting the interpretation that benefited the debtor-tenant, as the resumption of the lease was a renunciation of the judgment, which amounted to its satisfaction and thus a legal ground to quash executions. Furthermore, the alleged new covenant of P35 per month, which was not denied by the petitioner in her reply, provided a sounder basis for lifting the execution, as it rendered the judgment to dispossess obsolete and unenforceable. On the issue of whether the acceptance of rent payments constituted a renewal of the lease agreement, thereby renouncing the judgment of dispossession: The acceptance of rent payments by the petitioner, covering the months of April, May, and June 1945, after the issuance of the writ of execution, was interpreted by the Municipal Court as establishing a new contract. While the petitioner was entitled to collect rents past due, her acceptance of rent for the entire month of June, after a judgment ordering dispossession, placed her in a position of inability to enforce the writ of dispossession at least until the end of June. This conduct was deemed against the tenor of the judgment and a renunciation of her right as a victorious litigant to resume her role as lessor. The court reasoned that the application of the principle should not depend on the number of days or months but upon the nature of the act. The prevailing party may, by inaction or by express contract for consideration, agree to postpone execution. In this case, the act of accepting rent in advance for June was interpreted as a resumption of the lessor-lessee ties, which she had attempted to terminate by the suit. The respondent judge's interpretation that a new contract was established, thereby making the judgment obsolete and unenforceable, was considered a sound basis for quashing the execution, especially since the petitioner failed to deny the allegation of a new covenant for P35 per month.
Main Doctrine
Accepting rent payments covering a period subsequent to a judgment of eviction, without express agreement to renew the lease, may be deemed a renunciation of the judgment of dispossession, justifying the quashal of a writ of execution.