Mendoza v. Palacio

G.R. No. L-658 · 1946-10-25 · J. PERFECTO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for execution of a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The motion was based on the defendant-appellant's failure to pay or deposit the rent of P25 for the month of July 1946, by August 10, 1946, as required. Procedural History: The CFI of Manila rendered a decision on January 22, 1946. The defendant-appellant appealed this decision. The Petition: The defendant-appellant alleged that he had filed an appeal bond of P60 and a supersedeas bond of P80 with the clerk of the CFI on October 6, 1945. He also contended that Section 9 of the Rules of Court does not mandate the monthly payment or deposit of rentals within the first ten days of the calendar month.

Issue(s)

Whether the posting of a supersedeas bond relieves the defendant-appellant from the obligation to pay or deposit current monthly rentals pending appeal. Whether Section 9 of the Rules of Court, in conjunction with Section 8, requires the payment or deposit of monthly rentals within the first ten days of each calendar month during the pendency of an appeal from a CFI decision.

Ruling

The petition for execution of the appealed decision of the lower court is granted, without prejudice to the appeal interposed by the defendant.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether a supersedeas bond relieves the appellant from paying current rents: The Court held that the supersedeas bond does not relieve the appellant from the obligation of paying or depositing current rents pending appeal. Citing the case of Mitschiener vs. Barrios, the Court reiterated that the purpose of a supersedeas bond in ejectment cases is to insure the payment of unpaid back rents or the reasonable value of the use of the premises, but not to take the place of the payment or deposit of current rents. Therefore, the appellant's contention that the P80 supersedeas bond absolved him from paying the July rent was rejected. On the issue of the timeliness of payment under Section 9 of the Rules of Court: The Court found that while Section 9 of Rule 72 does not explicitly specify the deadline for paying or depositing monthly rents pending appeal to the Supreme Court, reason dictates that such payment cannot be left to the appellant's discretion. The Court drew an analogy between the situation of an appeal from the justice of the peace court to the CFI (governed by Section 8) and an appeal from the CFI to the Supreme Court (governed by Section 9). Section 8 requires payment or deposit on or before the tenth day of each calendar month for the preceding month's use and occupation in the absence of a contract. The Court reasoned that a similar procedure should logically apply to appeals to the Supreme Court, as the legal positions of the parties are analogous. This interpretation is considered fair and even more favorable to the tenant, as it provides a ten-day grace period compared to ordinary monthly payments.

Main Doctrine

A supersedeas bond posted in an ejectment case does not relieve the appellant from the obligation to pay or deposit current rents pending appeal. The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure payment of back rents or the reasonable value of the use of the premises, not to substitute for current rent payments.

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