Tavora v. Gavina
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Nicanor Tavora was appointed justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, on April 16, 1916. He served until December 1941, reassumed office on April 27, 1945, after liberation. During the Japanese occupation, he performed duties as justice of the peace under an appointment from the Chairman of the Executive Commission. Procedural History: Respondent Bonifacio N. Gavina was appointed ad-interim justice of the peace on February 18, 1946, but this appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments. Respondent Pedro O. Arciaga was appointed justice of the peace on July 27, 1946, and his appointment was approved. The Petition: Petitioner Tavora filed a petition questioning the validity of the appointments of Gavina and Arciaga, asserting his constitutional right to continue in office until he reached the age of seventy.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner's performance of duties as justice of the peace during the Japanese occupation constituted an abandonment of his office. Whether the appointment of respondent Gavina, though disapproved, affected the petitioner's tenure. Whether the appointment of respondent Arciaga, which was approved, removed the petitioner from his office. Whether the transition from the Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines affected the tenure of appointive officers, specifically judges.
Ruling
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding that his constitutional right to hold office until the age of seventy was not affected by the appointments of the respondents or the transition from the Commonwealth to the Republic. The dispositive portion of the resolution denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether performance of duties during Japanese occupation constituted abandonment: The Court held that performing duties as justice of the peace during the Japanese occupation, under an appointment from the Chairman of the Executive Commission, did not constitute an abandonment of the office held under the Commonwealth. This was based on the principle that the government established during the occupation was not a foreign government but an agency of the military occupant to preserve order. The Court cited Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and the US Supreme Court case of The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery to support the view that courts established during occupation are agents of the military power and not courts of a foreign sovereign. On the effect of respondent Gavina's appointment: The ad-interim appointment of respondent Bonifacio N. Gavina as justice of the peace, even if it had been approved, did not oust the petitioner from his office. This is because the petitioner possessed the constitutional right to continue in office until he reached the age of seventy years. Furthermore, the President of the Commonwealth did not have the power to remove the petitioner without just cause and a previous investigation, as guaranteed by the Constitution. On the effect of respondent Arciaga's appointment: The appointment of respondent Pedro O. Arciaga as justice of the peace, approved by the Commission on Appointments, also did not remove the petitioner from his office. The petitioner's constitutional right to continue as justice of the peace until he reached seventy years of age remained intact. The cessation of American sovereignty and the proclamation of Philippine Independence did not, by itself, terminate the petitioner's position as justice of the peace. On the effect of the transition from Commonwealth to Republic on tenure: The Court affirmed that the Constitution of the Philippines applies to both the Commonwealth and the Republic. Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth shall thenceforth be known as the Republic. The transition did not necessitate a new appointment for officers holding office during the Commonwealth, especially those with constitutional guarantees of tenure, such as judges. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius was deemed inapplicable because the inclusion of a provision regarding elected officials continuing in office was mandated by the Philippine Independence Act, not a voluntary choice of the framers, thus precluding an inference that other officers were intended to cease their tenure. The Court emphasized the principle of continuity and stability in government transitions and the protection afforded to judges by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Main Doctrine
The tenure of office of judges of inferior courts, including justices of the peace, is protected by the Constitution, guaranteeing them office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated. This constitutional right is not affected by the transition from the Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines, and subsequent appointments do not oust an incumbent holding such constitutional protection without just cause and due process.