Federal Films v. David
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved a civil case, Pablo Roman, plaintiff, versus Federal Films, Inc., defendant. The specific details of the original dispute are not elaborated upon in this excerpt, but the case reached the Supreme Court due to a procedural issue concerning the perfection of an appeal. 2. Procedural History: Federal Films, Inc. (petitioner) received notice of a judgment against it on September 27, 1946. The petitioner filed a petition to set aside the judgment on September 28, 1946, which was denied on October 8, 1946. A motion for reconsideration of this denial was filed on October 17, 1946, and denied on October 31, 1946. Subsequently, on November 7, 1946, the petitioner filed its notice of appeal, record on appeal, and appeal bond. The respondent judge dismissed this appeal, ruling that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. 3. The Petition: The petitioner, Federal Films, Inc., filed an original proceeding for certiorari seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge dismissing its appeal. The core of the petition hinges on the interpretation of Rule 41, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, specifically regarding the computation of the thirty-day period for perfecting an appeal. The petitioner argues that the time during which its petition to set aside the judgment was pending should be deducted, and that the respondent judge's dismissal was based on an incorrect calculation of this period, leading to an unjust deprivation of its right to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period of thirty days. Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. Whether the computation of the reglementary period, including the deduction for the time a motion to set aside was pending, was correctly applied.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The appeal was filed one day late.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period of thirty days: The Court ruled that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period. The period for perfecting an appeal is thirty days from notice of the judgment. The time during which a petition to set aside the judgment was pending is to be deducted. The Court computed the total period from September 27, 1946 (date of notice of judgment) to November 7, 1946 (date of appeal perfection) as 41 days, excluding the first day and including the last. The period during which the petition to set aside was pending, from September 28, 1946, to October 8, 1946, was computed as 10 days, excluding the first day and including the last. Deducting 10 days from 41 days resulted in 31 days, indicating the appeal was filed one day late. On Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the reglementary period for appeal: The Court held that the 30-day period was not interrupted by the filing of the motion for reconsideration on October 17, 1946, as it was a mere reiteration of the grounds alleged in the petition to set aside. This is in accordance with Rule of Court No. 37, section 4. Therefore, the period continued to run from the date the petitioner was notified of the denial of the petition to set aside. On Whether the computation of the reglementary period, including the deduction for the time a motion to set aside was pending, was correctly applied: The Court applied Rule of Court No. 28 for the computation of time, which excludes the first day and includes the last day. The Court found that the period from September 27 to November 7, 1946, was 41 days. The period from September 28 to October 8, 1946, during which the petition to set aside was pending, was 10 days. The deduction of 10 days from 41 days resulted in 31 days, meaning the appeal was filed one day beyond the 30-day reglementary period. The Court also overruled the decision in Taroma vs. Cruz and Galinato insofar as it included the date of filing the motion for new trial and the date of notification of denial in the time consumed by the court in considering the motion, which would have resulted in the appeal being timely filed.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a motion for reconsideration does not interrupt the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal if the motion is a mere reiteration of grounds previously alleged. The computation of time for perfecting an appeal must exclude the first day and include the last day, and the time during which a motion to set aside has been pending is to be deducted.