Kabiling v. Peña
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Rufino Kabiling initiated a civil case against Rosa Nitorreda and city officials, asserting a superior right to occupy market stalls Nos. 250 to 253. Kabiling sought an injunction to prevent his eviction from these stalls. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by Judge Emilio Peña, ruled in favor of Rosa Nitorreda, declaring her the lawful occupant of the market stalls and ordering Kabiling to pay daily damages from August 10, 1946, until he vacated the premises. The preliminary injunction was dissolved. Subsequently, Nitorreda filed a motion for execution of the judgment, which was granted by Judge Peña despite Kabiling's opposition and willingness to post a bond for damages pending appeal. 3. The Petition: Kabiling filed a petition seeking to annul the order for the writ of execution and the orders denying his motion to dismiss the injunction case. He contended that the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal was not justified by special reasons, and that Republic Act No. 37 and related departmental orders should have led to the dismissal of his case. Kabiling argued that the respondent judge acted without and in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted without and in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition to dismiss the injunction case and in issuing the writ of execution pending appeal. Whether Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 of the Department of Finance justified the dismissal of the injunction case.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The order for the issuance of the writ of execution and the orders denying the petition to dismiss the injunction case are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the petition to dismiss and the issuance of the writ of execution: The Court held that the petitioner himself characterized civil case No. 312 as an "injunction case." His evidence aimed not to establish a permanent legal right to the stalls but merely actual occupancy based on a provincial or conventional permission from the market master, for which he sought protection through injunction. Consequently, Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court was applicable. This provision states that "unless otherwise ordered by the court," a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of the appeal. The Court found no such "otherwise ordered" stipulation in the present case, thus the judgment was not automatically stayed. On the applicability of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32: The Court reiterated its ruling in Co Chiong and Lim Chiu Guan vs. Dinglasan that the Secretary of Finance had suspended motu proprio the operation of Department Order No. 32. Without this or a similar order, Republic Act No. 37 was not susceptible of execution in the manner asserted by the petitioner. Therefore, these enactments did not provide a basis for dismissing the injunction case as contended by the petitioner.
Main Doctrine
The Court held that a judgment in an action for injunction, unless otherwise ordered by the court, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of appeal, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. The Court also clarified that Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 of the Department of Finance, concerning market stall occupancy, were not applicable in the manner asserted by the petitioner.