Cunaan v. Rodas
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involves three separate ejectment actions filed by Pilar Faraon against Francisco Cunaan, Deogracias Atienza, and Felix Espino. The municipal court ruled in favor of Faraon, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay monthly rentals of thirty pesos. The petitioners were tenants occupying the properties. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners appealed the municipal court's decision to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Subsequently, Pilar Faraon filed a motion for execution. On March 25, 1947, the Court of First Instance ordered the issuance of writs of execution, citing the petitioners' failure to deposit the monthly rentals with the court within the period specified by law during the pendency of their appeal. 3. The Petition: The petitioners have filed an original petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking relief from the order of execution. They contend that their delay in depositing the rentals was due to excusable circumstances and attempt to invoke provisions of the Rental Law (Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66) and prior Supreme Court rulings. However, the Court notes that the defense of excusable negligence was not raised in the lower court, and the Rental Law applies to final judgments, not executions pending appeal. The Court also distinguishes this case from prior rulings where landlords waived their right to immediate execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal despite the deposit of rentals being made beyond the reglementary period. Whether the petitioners may avail of the exception recognized in Zamora v. Dinglasan and Hilario regarding delay due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Whether the Rental Law (Commonwealth Act No. 689) and Republic Act No. 66 are applicable to the case. Whether the doctrine in Manotok v. Legaspi and Legaspi regarding waiver of the right to immediate execution is applicable.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The order of execution issued by the respondent judge is sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On the mandatory nature of Section 8 of Rule of Court No. 72: The Court reiterated its previous rulings in Zamora v. Dinglasan and Hilario and Caluag Domingo v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Roman Vda. de Moreno, holding that Section 8 of Rule of Court No. 72, which authorizes immediate execution when a defendant in an ejectment case appeals and fails to pay or deposit the rents due from time to time on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, is mandatory. This provision leaves the court without any discretion in the matter, emphasizing the strict adherence required for timely rental deposits during the pendency of an appeal. On the exception for fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence: The Court held that even if the delay in depositing the rent was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, this defense cannot be inquired into because it was not raised and properly made the subject of proof before the respondent judge. The petitioners' admission of depositing the rent beyond the reglementary ten-day period, without having properly raised and proven any excusable cause for the delay in the lower court, precluded them from invoking this exception. On the applicability of the Rental Law and Republic Act No. 66: The Court clarified that the Rental Law (Commonwealth Act No. 689) and Republic Act No. 66 are not applicable to the present case. The Rental Law refers to the suspension of executions of final and executory judgments, not to executions pending appeal. Similarly, Republic Act No. 66, which might have provided exceptions, was deemed inapplicable, especially since the respondent Faraon needed the premises for her own use, a fact that, if proven, would fall under specific exceptions but not for execution pending appeal. On the doctrine of waiver in Manotok v. Legaspi and Legaspi: The petitioners could not invoke the doctrine laid down in Manotok v. Legaspi and Legaspi, which allows for waiver of the right to immediate execution. The Court distinguished the present case from Manotok by stating that in the latter, it "unmistakably appears that appellee had waived the right by allowing the appellants to pay the rents out of time and by accepting the belated payments for the purpose of staying the execution of the judgment." In the instant case, there was no such clear waiver by the respondent Faraon; instead, she moved for execution upon the petitioners' failure to comply with the mandatory deposit requirement.
Main Doctrine
The provision of Section 8 of Rule of Court No. 72, mandating immediate execution in ejectment cases when the defendant fails to deposit the rental fixed by the municipal court within the specified period, is mandatory and leaves the court without discretion. Failure to raise defenses like fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence before the respondent judge bars their consideration on appeal. Furthermore, the Rental Law (Commonwealth Act No. 689) and Republic Act No. 66 apply only to final and executory judgments, not to executions pending appeal.