People v. Valderama
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Feliciano Valderama, along with several other unapprehended individuals, was charged in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija with the crime of robbery. The information alleged the taking of personal properties belonging to Inocencio Mateo and Leonides Pablo on or about October 8, 1946, in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Procedural History: After arraignment, where Feliciano Valderama pleaded not guilty, the prosecution presented its first witness, Leonides Pablo. When the second witness, Emerenciana de San Jose, was called to testify regarding the robbery in Inocencio Mateo's house, the defense objected, arguing that the testimony tended to prove a second robbery after the first witness had testified to a robbery in Leonides Pablo's house. The respondent judge, in an order, ruled that the objection for duplicity could only be predicated on the information if the defect clearly appeared on its face, and that in this case, it was not clearly apparent. However, the judge also required the Provincial Fiscal to elect which of the two offenses he would stand on. The Petition: The Provincial Fiscal filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning the respondent judge's order. The core issue was whether the defendant, by failing to move to quash the information on the ground of duplicity before pleading, waived such objection.
Issue(s)
Whether the failure to move to quash the information on the ground of duplicity before pleading constitutes a waiver of such objection under Rule 113, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. Whether the information, as worded, charges one or more offenses of robbery.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in requiring the Provincial Fiscal to elect which offense to prosecute. The Court ordered the respondent judge to proceed with the trial of the case upon the existing information, continuing the examination of the second witness for the prosecution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of waiver of objection for duplicity: The Court held that Rule 113, Section 10 of the Rules of Court mandates that if a defendant does not move to quash the information before pleading, they shall be deemed to have waived all objections that are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the information does not charge an offense or the court is without jurisdiction. This rule represents a significant innovation from previous procedural rules, aiming for speedier trials. The Court emphasized that the use of the word "shall" in this provision makes it a peremptory duty for the judge to consider the objection waived if not raised before plea. Therefore, the defendant's failure to move to quash the information before pleading to the charge of robbery constituted a waiver of any objection regarding duplicity. On whether the information charges one or more offenses: The Court explicitly stated that it would not decide whether the information alleged two offenses of robbery or only one. However, even hypothetically supposing that it did charge two offenses, the failure to raise the objection before pleading meant that the defendant waived the right to complain about such defect later in the proceedings. The Court noted that the respondent judge's opinion that the defect was not clearly apparent on the face of the information was a matter that should have been addressed through a timely motion to quash, not through an order to elect after the trial had commenced.
Main Doctrine
Failure to move to quash an information on the ground of duplicity before pleading thereto constitutes a waiver of such objection, as mandated by Rule 113, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, which requires immediate action upon arraignment.