Enriquez v. Bautista
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case concerns a petition for mandamus filed by Martin Enriquez and Damasa Ponseca, seeking to compel the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan to approve their record on appeal. The underlying dispute stems from a petition for investigation filed by the petitioners, which had been denied twice previously by the respondent court. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners filed their third petition for investigation on October 11, 1946, which was denied by the respondent Judge on October 25, 1946. Notice of this order was sent via registered mail on the same date but was returned unclaimed. A second mailing of the notice on December 14, 1946, was received by the petitioners' attorney on January 6, 1947. Subsequently, on January 28, 1947, the petitioners filed a record on appeal from the October 25, 1946 order. This record on appeal was disapproved by the respondent Judge on March 12, 1947, for being filed out of time. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel the approval of their record on appeal. Their primary argument is that the appeal period should commence from January 6, 1947, the date their attorney actually received the notice, and that the prior unclaimed registered mail and subsequent remailing did not effectively perfect the appeal within the statutory period. They contend that the presumption of official duty regularly performed is insufficient to overcome their counsel's denial of receiving postal notices and that service by mail is only complete upon actual receipt.
Issue(s)
Whether the record on appeal was filed within the reglementary period. Whether service of the order dated October 25, 1946, was complete upon the return of the registered letter as unclaimed, or only upon actual receipt by the attorney.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus is dismissed. The record on appeal was filed out of time.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that the record on appeal was filed out of time. Service by registered mail is governed by Section 8 of Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which states that service is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or, if the addressee fails to claim the mail within five days from the date of the first notice, service is deemed complete upon the expiration of that five-day period. In this case, the first notice was sent on October 28, 1946. Assuming the addressee failed to claim the mail, service was complete on November 3, 1946. The 30-day reglementary period for appeal would thus commence on November 3, 1946, making the filing on January 28, 1947, clearly beyond the deadline. On Issue 2: The Court held that the service of the order dated October 25, 1946, was complete upon the expiration of the five-day period for claiming the registered mail, as provided by Rule 27, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. The allegation that the attorney never received the postal notices could not prevail over the positive statement of the post office superintendent and the legal presumption that official duty was regularly performed. The registered letter was sent to the attorney's correct address, and there was no notification of a change of address. The excuse that the attorney did not stay in one place permanently was deemed insufficient, as attorneys must maintain a system to receive prompt judicial notices. The subsequent mailing of the notice on December 14, 1946, did not affect the completed service, as it was an unnecessary act and not ordered by the court. Furthermore, the filing of an independent action by the attorney on November 19, 1946, suggested prior knowledge of the order.
Main Doctrine
The Court affirmed that service by registered mail is considered complete not only upon actual receipt by the addressee but also upon the expiration of five days from the date of the first notice from the postmaster if the addressee fails to claim the mail. This rule is crucial for determining the reglementary period for filing appeals, ensuring that parties are diligent in monitoring their mail and that judicial proceedings are not unduly delayed by a party's inaction.