Aquiño v. Blanco
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved a property ownership case between Santiago Aquiño and Dionisia Aguirre, as plaintiffs, and Dominga Salveron, as defendant. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a judgment on February 5, 1947, declaring Dominga Salveron the owner of Parcel No. 1 and the plaintiffs Aquiño and Aguirre the owners of Parcel No. 2, with no special pronouncement on costs. 2. Procedural History: Notice of the judgment was served on Atty. Basilio Sorioso, who had represented Dominga Salveron. However, Atty. Sorioso had since been appointed Assistant Provincial Fiscal and had ceased private practice. He failed to notify his client of the judgment due to his busy official duties and inadvertence. Salveron only learned of the decision when a writ of execution was served on her on March 26, 1947. Subsequently, on April 2, 1947, Salveron filed a petition to vacate the writ of execution. This petition was initially denied but later granted by respondent Judge Manuel Blanco on May 24, 1947. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Santiago Aquiño and Dionisia Aguirre, are seeking review of the order issued by respondent Judge Manuel Blanco. They contend that the notice of judgment to Atty. Sorioso, who was no longer their counsel of record, was invalid. The respondents argue that the notice was ineffective because their counsel had accepted a government position, and they only became aware of the judgment upon service of the writ of execution. They invoked Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, seeking relief from the judgment due to accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which the respondent judge granted.
Issue(s)
Whether the notice of judgment served upon Atty. Basilio Sorioso, who had ceased private practice and become Assistant Provincial Fiscal, constituted valid notice to the respondent Dominga Salveron. Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition to vacate the writ of execution and allowing the presentation of a record on appeal.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The order of respondent Judge Blanco dated May 24, 1947, granting the petition to vacate the writ of execution and permitting the defendant to present a record on appeal, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the notice of judgment: The Court held that when Atty. Basilio Sorioso was appointed Assistant Provincial Fiscal, he legally ceased to engage in private law practice. Consequently, he was disqualified from continuing to represent his former client, Dominga Salveron. Therefore, the notice of the decision served upon him on February 11, 1947, was not legally effective notice to the respondent. The period for perfecting an appeal did not commence to run from that date. The Court emphasized that the failure to notify the client was due to inadvertence or excusable negligence on the part of the attorney, given his new official duties and the volume of work. This situation falls squarely within the purview of Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides for relief from judgments or proceedings taken against a party through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion: The Court found that based on the facts and circumstances, a good case for equitable relief was made out under Rule 38, Section 2. The respondent Judge Blanco did not abuse his discretion in entering his order of May 24, 1947. This order set aside the previous denial of the petition to vacate the writ of execution and permitted the defendant to present a record on appeal. The issuance of the writ of execution itself was an "order" or "proceeding" taken against the defendant, and the circumstances surrounding the lack of actual notice to her justified the relief granted by the respondent judge. The Court reiterated that the respondent's knowledge of the decision only came upon service of the writ of execution, which was significantly later than the purported notice to her former counsel.
Main Doctrine
Notice of judgment to a counsel who has ceased to practice law and assumed public office is not valid notice to the client, and the period for appeal does not commence until the client has actual knowledge of the judgment, especially when the failure to notify is due to excusable negligence, warranting relief under Rule 38, Section 2.