Mercado v. Go Bio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Nicolas C. Mercado was the registered owner of a house. Benito Go Bio became the owner in 1938. They entered into a transaction where Go Bio would transfer the property back to Mercado for P26,655.54, payable after a certain period, with Mercado paying P200 monthly rent until repurchase. Mercado's option to repurchase was set to expire on February 21, 1943, but it was not exercised. In September 1944, Japanese military personnel demanded Mercado vacate the house, which he did. In February 1945, during the battle for Manila, the house was abandoned. Go Bio then occupied the house and allowed refugees to shelter there, claiming to have spent P10,000 on repairs. Go Bio and the refugees had permission from the American Provost Marshal to occupy the house. Procedural History: Mercado demanded Go Bio and the refugees vacate, which was refused. Mercado filed a municipal court action for dispossession against Go Bio and the refugees, winning a favorable judgment. The Court of First Instance reversed this judgment, absolving the defendants. Mercado appealed. The Petition: The appellant (Mercado) contends he has the right to recover material possession of the property under Rule 72, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, arguing he had legal possession even if not physical possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the summary action for forcible entry under Rule 72 is available to a plaintiff whose physical possession was taken by a third party (Japanese forces) and whose property was subsequently re-entered peacefully by the owner.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, ruling in favor of the appellees (Go Bio and the refugees). The Court held that Mercado was not entitled to recover possession under Rule 72, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that for a summary action under Rule 72 (now Rule 70) to prosper, the plaintiff must prove they were deprived of physical possession by the defendant through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In this case, the evidence established that the Japanese Imperial Navy, not the defendants, deprived Mercado of his possession; thus, the essential element of deprivation by the defendant is missing. Furthermore, the Court clarified that 'possession' in summary proceedings refers to actual physical possession (possession as a fact) rather than 'legal possession' under the Civil Code. As established in Mediran v. Villanueva, while the Civil Code suggests possession is not lost through violence, the procedural rules for forcible entry specifically contemplate a physical change in possession. Additionally, Go Bio entered the property peacefully and openly when it was abandoned and being looted, acting within his rights as the registered owner to protect the property. The Court also applied the principle of circuitas est evitandus, noting that Mercado had defaulted on his rent payments, giving Go Bio a current right to eject him anyway. Reinstating Mercado only to have him immediately ejected in a separate proceeding would be an absurdity that the law seeks to avoid by recognizing the owner's right of re-entry as a valid defense.
Main Doctrine
An action for unlawful deprivation of possession under Rule 72, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires proof of physical dispossession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and does not apply where the property was abandoned and subsequently occupied peacefully by the owner or by others with the owner's permission, especially when the tenant is in default of rent payments.