People v. Pastor
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were charged with violating sections 1458 and 1459 in relation to section 2723 of the Revised Administrative Code and Act No. 3243. The information alleged that they, as owners, managers, or administrators of "Magazine Center," deliberately neglected to make a return of their sales and evade payment of percentage tax between January 1936 and March 31, 1938. Procedural History: An information was filed on June 4, 1941, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Dumaguete and subsequently lodged with the Court of First Instance on July 11, 1941. No further proceedings were taken until January 27, 1946, when the accused filed a motion to quash, which was granted by the trial court on February 12, 1946. The Government appealed this order. The Petition: The Government appealed the order of the trial court quashing the information, arguing that despite the repeal of the relevant provisions, the prosecution could still proceed, particularly in light of Commonwealth Act No. 503.
Issue(s)
Whether violations of repealed penal provisions could be prosecuted after the repeal, especially considering the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503. Whether the acts imputed to the defendants were still penalized under the National Internal Revenue Code or Commonwealth Act No. 503.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court, holding that the appeal was without merit. The Court ruled that the repeal of the penal provisions under which the accused were charged, without a substantial re-enactment of the same offense in the repealing law, divested the courts of jurisdiction to prosecute the offense committed prior to the repeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prosecuting violations of repealed penal provisions: The Court held that the repeal of sections 1458 and 1459, in relation to section 2723 of the Revised Administrative Code, and Act No. 3243, by section 369 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, extinguished the penal liability for acts committed prior to the repeal, as the National Internal Revenue Code did not substantially re-enact the penalized acts. The Court cited United States v. Cuna (12 Phil. 241) for the doctrine that where a repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts constituting the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction. The Court noted that the National Internal Revenue Code, and even Commonwealth Act No. 503, wholly failed to penalize the acts imputed to the defendants. The Court distinguished this from cases like Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok v. United States where the repealing act substantially re-enacted the former law. On whether the acts were penalized under Commonwealth Act No. 466 or Commonwealth Act No. 503: The Court found that under section 186 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, only the manufacturer, producer, or importer was liable for the percentage tax on the original sale, and the defendants, as merchants selling newspapers, magazines, and stationery, were not the manufacturers, producers, or importers. Furthermore, even if section 191 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 were considered, it applied to publishers and not to persons acquiring items for resale. The Court also analyzed section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 503 and its proviso, concluding that it was designed to cover sales made on or after its approval (October 16, 1939), and thus did not apply to the sales made by the defendants between January 1936 and March 31, 1938. Therefore, the continuity of the obligation and the penal sanction for its violation was broken by the enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Main Doctrine
The repeal of penal statutes, where the repealing act wholly fails to penalize the acts constituting the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, carries with it the deprivation of courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.