General v. De Venecia
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Petra Vda. de Ruedas, representing minors, filed a complaint on June 4, 1946, against petitioner Luis F. General to recover the value of a promissory note dated September 25, 1944. The note promised to pay P4,000 within six months after peace has been declared and government established in the Philippines. Procedural History: The complaint prayed for preliminary attachment of the defendant's property, alleging he was about to dispose of his assets to defraud creditors. A writ of attachment was issued two days later. Petitioner moved for dismissal of the complaint and dissolution of the attachment, claiming it was premature due to Presidential Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 of 1945 (debt moratorium). The motion was denied, as was a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order denying his motion to dismiss and to vacate the attachment.
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint filed was premature. Whether the writ of attachment was validly issued.
Ruling
The writ of attachment is quashed and the complaint is dismissed. Costs for petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prematurity of the complaint: The Court held that the complaint was premature. The promissory note stipulated payment "within six months after peace has been declared." As it was a matter of contemporary history that the peace treaty had not been drafted and no competent official had formally declared the advent of peace, the six-month period had not commenced. Consequently, petitioner had no demandable duty to make payment at the time the complaint was filed, independently of any moratorium directive. The Court cited Raquiza vs. Bradford (75 Phil., 50) in support of the principle that peace had not been formally declared. On the validity of the attachment: The Court found the attachment to have been improvidently permitted. The debt was within the terms of the debt moratorium (Executive Order No. 32). The Court reiterated that upon objection by the debtor, no court may proceed to hear a complaint seeking to compel payment of a monetary obligation covered by the moratorium, as such enforcement is temporarily suspended. Furthermore, the issuance of a writ of attachment, being a step in the enforcement of the obligation, is not permissible. The general rule is that attachment is not available for a demand that is not due and payable, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise. Under the rules, the person seeking attachment must show a sufficient cause of action and that the amount is due, which conditions were not met as the obligation was not yet demandable. The Court cited Orbeta vs. Sotto (58 Phil., 505) for the principle that a complaint should have been dismissed and attachment lifted when the commitment of the debtor has not yet become demandable. The Court also noted that while certiorari is generally not for correcting judicial errors appealable, it is available when an attachment is wrongly levied because appeal may be inadequate, citing Leung Ben vs. O'Brien (38 Phil., 182) and Director of Commerce and Industry vs. Concepcion (43 Phil., 384).
Main Doctrine
A writ of attachment may not be issued for a debt that is not yet demandable, especially when the obligation falls within the purview of a debt moratorium, as such issuance constitutes an improvident act and a step in the enforcement of a suspended obligation.