Perez v. Ysip
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The respondent court, in Civil Case No. 255, issued a default order and subsequently a judgment against the petitioner, Francisco P. Perez, in favor of the respondents Severina Buenaventura, Julia Bernardino, Belen Bernardino, and Victoria Bernardino. 2. Procedural History: Following the default order and judgment on September 21, 1944, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on October 3, 1944. This motion remained unresolved until after the liberation of the Philippines. Upon reconstitution of the records, the court denied the motion for reconsideration on March 20, 1946. The petitioner's counsel received notice of this denial on March 28, 1946. Subsequently, on April 3, 1946, the petitioner filed an exception and notice of appeal, along with a second motion for reconsideration. However, the record on appeal and appeal bond were not filed until August 16, 1946, approximately four months later. Consequently, the lower court dismissed the appeal on October 22, 1946. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari, alleging that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction and abused his discretion by dismissing the appeal instead of giving it due course. The petitioner argues that his appeal was perfected within the reglementary period because he filed a second motion for reconsideration on April 3, 1946, which was denied on June 3, 1946. He claims to have learned of this denial only on August 12, 1946, making his filing of the record on appeal and appeal bond on August 16, 1946, timely. The respondents contend that the second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the appeal period and that, even if it did, the appeal documents were filed out of time, as notice of the June 3 denial was sent by ordinary mail on June 7, 1946, and presumed to have been received within a few days.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a second motion for reconsideration suspended the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. Whether the notice of the order denying the second motion for reconsideration was properly served on the petitioner. Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the trial court constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is denied. The order of dismissal of the appeal is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the filing of a second motion for reconsideration suspended the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal: The Court ruled that the second motion for reconsideration, filed on April 3, 1946, did not suspend the reglementary period for perfecting the appeal. The Court characterized this second motion as a mere reiteration of the first motion or raising issues that existed and could have been utilized when the first motion was filed. Therefore, it should have been included in the original motion or as an amendment before the court resolved it. The Court found that this second motion appeared to be an "afterthought" or a last-minute stratagem to counter the grounds stated by the court in its order denying the first motion for reconsideration. Consequently, it could not suspend the period for appeal, which had already begun to run in relation to the first motion for reconsideration. The Court cited jurisprudence supporting the principle that a second motion for reconsideration, if a mere rehash or raising issues that could have been presented earlier, does not interrupt the appeal period. On the issue of whether the notice of the order denying the second motion for reconsideration was properly served on the petitioner: The Court held that the notice sent to the petitioner's counsel was sufficient. The records showed that a copy of the order dated June 3, 1946, denying the second motion for reconsideration, was sent on June 7, 1946, via ordinary mail to the defendant's lawyer, whose postal address was in Santa Maria, Bulacan. The Court noted that during that period, registered mail service was not yet re-established. The legal presumption is that the addressee received the correspondence within 3 to 5 days, considering the short distance. There was no proof of the mail being returned. The Court dismissed the petitioner's claim of not knowing about the order until August 12, 1946, as he was represented by counsel, and notice to counsel is notice to the client. The Court also addressed the manner of sending the notice (folded and pasted, not in an envelope) by stating that due to abnormal conditions and scarcity, all notifications were sent in this manner without complaint. The fact that previous notifications sent similarly were received by the lawyer, and the lawyer did not deny receipt, further supported the validity of the notice. The silence of the lawyer, who was the direct recipient, was interpreted against the petitioner's claim. On the issue of whether the dismissal of the appeal by the trial court constituted grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The dismissal was a consequence of the petitioner's failure to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period. The Court reiterated that the second motion for reconsideration was not a valid basis for suspending the appeal period. The arguments regarding the Japanese military notes and duress, even if true, could have been raised earlier, especially after liberation when the petitioner himself initiated the reconstitution of the records and filed his first motion for reconsideration. The Court emphasized that litigation is more than a battle of technicalities and that parties must adhere to procedural rules. The petitioner's attempt to use the second motion as an "afterthought" to extend the appeal period was deemed improper.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration, which is a mere reiteration of the first or raises issues that could have been raised earlier, does not suspend the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. Furthermore, notice to counsel is sufficient notice to the client, and the presumption of receipt of ordinary mail is upheld in the absence of proof of non-receipt or return.