Parot v. Gemora
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff, as indorsee, filed an action against the defendant as a maker of a promissory note dated April 1, 1899, for P5,857, payable on March 31, 1903, to Tomasa Gemora, widow of Perez, for herself and as judicial administrator and legal tutor for her children. The note was signed by Carlos Gemora and Asuncion Aguilar. Asuncion Aguilar died in February 1901. Tomasa Gemora indorsed the note to Lizarraga Hermanos on February 20, 1901, who in turn indorsed it to the plaintiff on January 16, 1903. Procedural History: The defendant admitted the execution of the note but alleged payment. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, with the concurrence of assessors, found that the note was executed and indorsed as alleged, that it had not been paid, and that the plaintiff was due P5,857 Mexican currency with 6% interest from March 31, 1903. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff for P5,845.30 Philippine currency, considering the exchange rate between Mexican and Philippine currency. The defendant excepted to the judgment. The Petition: The defendant appealed, assigning three errors: (1) rendering judgment against him for the full amount of the debt of himself and his deceased co-maker; (2) declaring Exhibit 1 (defendant's exhibit) false; and (3) declaring that the debt had not been paid.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant is liable for the full amount of the promissory note despite the co-maker's death and the absence of a motion for a new trial in the lower court. Whether the phrase "juntos o separadamente" in the promissory note creates individual liability for the full amount of the obligation.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding the defendant liable for the full amount of the promissory note, with interest and costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first and third assignments of error (questions of fact): The Court held that since the defendant did not file a motion for a new trial in the Court of First Instance, the Supreme Court could not examine the evidence to ascertain whether the findings of fact by the lower court were supported. Therefore, the second and third assignments of error, which presented questions of fact, could not be reviewed. On the first assignment of error (question of law regarding liability): The Court addressed the appellant's claim that the phrase "juntos o separadamente" did not render each maker liable for the full amount. The Court referred to Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code, which state that obligations contracted by two or more persons are presumed to be joint (pro rata), unless the contract expressly makes them solidary or severally liable for the full amount. The Court opined that the phrase "juntos o separadamente" in the promissory note constituted an express statement making each signatory individually liable for the entire obligation. This phrase was deemed equivalent to "mancomun o insolidum," creating individual liability. The Court cited Louisiana jurisprudence where similar phrases in promissory notes were held to create individual liability. The Court found the facts sufficient to justify the lower court's conclusion regarding the defendant's liability for the full amount.
Main Doctrine
The phrase "juntos o separadamente" in a promissory note creates individual liability for the full amount of the obligation, equivalent to "mancomun o insolidum".