Morales v. Zamora
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Edilberto Morales leased premises at 1204 Rizal Avenue, Manila, since December 1941, operating a barbershop. The monthly rental was initially P25, later increased to P31. Morales failed to pay rent regularly starting November 1944. Respondent Melecio Zamora, the owner, notified Morales in May 1945 to vacate, stating he needed the premises for his own business. Procedural History: Three cases were jointly tried: Morales' suit to compel Zamora to accept P30 for May 1945 rent (mandamus); Zamora's suit to eject Morales (ejectment); and Morales' suit for damages due to Zamora's refusal to vacate. The Court of First Instance dismissed the first and third cases, ordered Morales to surrender the premises and pay P30 monthly rent until vacating, and awarded costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in toto. The Petition: Morales, as petitioner, sought review via certiorari, arguing that Republic Act No. 66 prohibited his ejectment as the one-year period had not elapsed and that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the premises commercial, contrary to the last sentence of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 66.
Issue(s)
Whether the premises used as a barbershop, where the owner also resides, qualifies as a 'dwelling' and 'home industry' under Republic Act No. 66, thus prohibiting ejectment. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in classifying the premises as commercial.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petition for certiorari was denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the premises used as a barbershop, where the owner also resides, qualifies as a 'dwelling' and 'home industry' under Republic Act No. 66, thus prohibiting ejectment: The Court held that the petitioner could not invoke the provisions of Republic Act No. 66. The Court of Appeals found that the premises were devoted to the 'business of a barbershop.' The respondent's uncontroverted statement indicated that the establishment had six barber chairs and employed several hair-cutters who were not members of the petitioner's family. This scale of operation and employment of external labor for profit distinguished it from a 'home industry' intended solely for the family's sustenance. The Court reasoned that while an artisan pursuing their trade for livelihood in their dwelling might be considered a home industry, the expansion of such a business to employ others for increased returns transforms it into a commercial establishment. The incidental fact that the family resides therein does not include such a tenant in the class favored by emergency housing legislation. The Court found it ridiculous to consider well-appointed barbershops as residences simply because a barber's family might be quartered there. The distinction between an artisan pursuing their calling for a livelihood and setting up a commercial establishment for gain, employing others, is a recognized legal principle. Therefore, the petitioner could not successfully plead the maintenance of a 'home industry.' On Whether the Court of Appeals erred in classifying the premises as commercial: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the premises were commercial and thus not covered by Republic Act No. 66. While the attorney for the petitioner questioned the automatic classification of premises on Rizal Avenue as commercial, the Court found that the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the premises were used for a 'barbershop business' was controlling. Furthermore, the Court noted that Republic Act No. 66 applies to 'dwellings' only. The argument that the upper portion was used as a residence and thus included under the Act's provisions for buildings used both as a dwelling and for home industries was rejected. The Court reiterated that the barbershop, with its scale of operation and employment of others, was a business establishment, not a home industry. The Court deemed it unnecessary to further expound on the extent and scope of the one-year period provided in the emergency enactments, given its conclusion that the petitioner could not invoke them.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that a barbershop with six chairs and employing several hair-cutters not belonging to the family, even if the owner resides in the premises, constitutes a commercial establishment and not a 'home industry'. Consequently, the tenant could not invoke the protective provisions of Republic Act No. 66, which applies only to dwellings and home industries for family support. The Court emphasized that the scale of operation and the employment of others for profit, rather than mere livelihood, are determinative factors in classifying an establishment.