Soroñgon v. Makalintal
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns ownership and possession of Lot No. 2, plan PSU-103496. Petitioners Amado Soroñgon and Miguel Mercado claim to have been in actual possession of this land as owners since 1933, prior to a registration proceeding initiated by respondents. 2. Procedural History: Respondents were declared owners of the disputed property in a registration proceeding. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the respondents. The petitioners, who were not parties to the registration proceeding and claim they were not properly served with summons, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the judge and the declared owners, arguing the writ was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. They also filed an ordinary action to set aside the decree of registration on grounds of fraud. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of possession. Their primary contentions are that they were not parties to the registration proceeding and did not receive proper summons, despite their continuous possession since 1933. They also assert that their subsequent filing of an action to set aside the decree due to fraud should have prevented the issuance of the writ of possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing a writ of possession. Whether the petitioners, not being parties to the registration proceeding and not having been personally served with summons, are bound by the decree of registration and the subsequent writ of possession. Whether the filing of an ordinary action to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud bars the issuance of a writ of possession.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of possession. The petitioners are bound by the decree of registration, and their subsequent action to set aside the decree does not bar the issuance of the writ of possession.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and the issuance of the writ of possession: The Court held that a writ of possession must be issued within the same period as summary execution of judgments in ordinary civil actions, upon petition of the registered owner or successor in interest, against all parties claiming a right or interest prior to registration. This is a proceeding in rem, meaning the decree of registration binds all persons, including the Government, irrespective of personal notification or appearance, as all interested parties are considered notified by publication as required by law. The decree of registration is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and its branches, whether named in the application or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." On whether petitioners are bound by the decree despite not being parties and not being personally served: The Court reiterated the doctrine that a decree of registration binds all persons. Citing Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, the Court stated that even if a party occupying land was not personally served notice, if they were made a party defendant by publication, the decree of registration is conclusive against them. The petitioners' claim of actual possession since 1933, prior to the survey and registration, meant they were among those considered notified by publication in the in rem proceeding. On whether the ordinary action to set aside the decree bars the writ of possession: The Court clarified that if a decree of registration was obtained by fraud, the aggrieved party may file a petition for review within one year from the issuance and entry of the decree with the Court of Land Registration to have it set aside. However, such a decree cannot be collaterally attacked by persons claiming title or interest prior to the registration proceeding. Therefore, the fact that the petitioners instituted an ordinary action more than one year after the decree was issued, attacking its validity on the ground of fraud, does not serve as a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the registered owners.
Main Doctrine
A writ of possession issued in a registration proceeding is binding upon all parties, including those in actual possession, even if not personally notified, due to the in rem nature of the proceeding and constructive notice by publication. An ordinary action to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud, filed more than one year after its issuance, does not bar the issuance of the writ of possession.