Arches v. Bellasillo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On January 10, 1947, the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz filed a complaint before the Justice of the Peace Court of Capiz against Jose A. Arches for unlawfully blocking the course of the Talaga River and Lacturan Creek by constructing dikes, causing prejudice to the inhabitants of barrios Tanza and Banica by obstructing their fluvial passage. The offense was alleged to have occurred from 1939 up to the date of the complaint. Procedural History: The accused filed a motion to quash, alleging (a) that the offense and its penalty had already prescribed, and (b) that the Justice of the Peace Court of Capiz lacked jurisdiction, as the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the contiguous municipality of Panay. The Justice of the Peace Court denied the motion. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance, which was also dismissed. The present appeal is from the decision of the Court of First Instance. The Petition: The accused appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance, which dismissed his petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue(s)
Whether the offense of obstructing a river course, alleged to have been committed from 1939 up to the date of the complaint, has prescribed. Whether the Justice of the Peace Court of Capiz has jurisdiction over the offense.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, holding that the appeal lacks merit. The Court ordered that the costs be charged to the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the offense had not prescribed. The complaint alleged that the accused "did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously block the course of the Talaga River and Lacturan Creek... thereby causing prejudice to the inhabitants... by obstructing their only shortest fluvial passage." The Court reasoned that the act of obstruction, by the construction of dikes, was a continuous offense. As long as the dikes remained, obstructing the river and creek, the offense did not cease. Therefore, the prescriptive period could not commence until the offense was completed or had ceased. The Court distinguished this from a situation where the obstruction existed up to a certain date, and the prescriptive period had elapsed thereafter before the filing of the complaint. The Court stated, "While the dikes are currently there, obstructing the course of the river and creek in question, there is no solution of continuity, the offense does not cease; therefore, the prescriptive period cannot run, which would only take place from the time the offense was committed and finished." On the issue of jurisdiction: The Court found the second ground for the motion to quash to be even less meritorious. The complaint explicitly stated that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Capiz. The Court reiterated the elementary principle that jurisdiction and competence of courts are determined by what is alleged in the complaint or information. While affidavits might have suggested the rivers were within the municipality of Panay, these affidavits were not part of the complaint, and in any event, such a point would constitute a matter of proof, not a ground for a special recourse like certiorari. The Court also noted the impropriety of such a recourse, which causes considerable delay in the disposition of the main case. The Court suggested that if the case had proceeded in the Justice of the Peace Court, the issues raised could have been presented as a defense, and the accused would still have had the right to appeal.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for a continuing offense does not commence until the offense has ceased. Furthermore, jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.