People v. Esguerra
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Twelve criminal cases were filed against various defendants for violations of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series 1944, of Tacloban, Leyte. The ordinance prohibited the manufacture, distillation, production, curing, selling, bartering, offering, giving away, disposal, possession, or control of any intoxicating liquor, including tuba. It also revoked all existing permits and licenses related to such activities. Procedural History: The informations charged some defendants with selling, bartering, conveying, offering, giving, or disposing of whisky or intoxicating liquor to United States Army soldiers without legal authority. Other defendants were charged with unlawfully possessing and controlling "tuba" or intoxicating liquor without authority. The cases against Timoteo Esguerra, Jose Chan, Felix Labordo, and Pilar E. Pascual, along with seven other cases, were jointly heard. The defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series 1944, was null and void for being enacted without the municipal council's power. The lower court declared the ordinance void and dismissed the cases. The People of the Philippines appealed this decision. The Petition: The prosecuting attorney appealed the dismissal of the twelve cases, contending that the ordinance was validly enacted under the police power of the municipality, as conferred by the general welfare clause, Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue(s)
Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series 1944, enacted by the municipal council of Tacloban, Leyte, is valid. Whether the municipal council of Tacloban had the power to prohibit the selling, giving away, and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dismissing the informations. The Court held that Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series 1944, was ultravires and therefore null and void.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series 1944: The Court held that the lower court did not err in declaring Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series 1944, ultravires and null and void. While municipal councils are granted broad powers under the general welfare clause (Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code) to enact ordinances necessary for the health, safety, and good order of the municipality, these ordinances must not be repugnant to law. The ordinance in question, which prohibited the selling, giving away, and dispensing of liquor, was found to be repugnant to Section 2242(g) of the same Revised Administrative Code. This specific provision grants municipal councils the power to "regulate" the selling, giving away, and dispensing of intoxicating liquors at retail. The Court emphasized that the term "regulate" encompasses control, governance, and restraint, but it cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Therefore, a power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. On the power of the municipal council to prohibit the selling, giving away, and dispensing of intoxicating liquors: The Court clarified that the powers conferred by the general welfare clause (Section 2238) are intended for matters not covered by other specific provisions of the Code. Since Section 2242(g) specifically grants the power to regulate the liquor traffic, this specific provision governs, and the general welfare clause cannot be invoked to grant a broader power of prohibition. To allow the general welfare clause to override the specific provision would render Section 2242(g) superfluous and nugatory. The Court cited American jurisprudence, which uniformly holds that the legislative authority to license or regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors does not authorize a municipality to prohibit it, either expressly or by imposing prohibitive license fees. The general power granted in the general welfare clause does not authorize the municipal council to prohibit the sale of intoxicants, as the specific authority to regulate implies that the power to prohibit is withheld.
Main Doctrine
A municipal council, empowered only to regulate the selling, giving away, and dispensing of intoxicating liquors under Section 2242(g) of the Revised Administrative Code, cannot enact an ordinance prohibiting such activities, as the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. Such an ordinance is considered ultravires and void.