Fermin v. Eugenio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 96, filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The plaintiff, Estanislao Fermin, acting as administrator for the estate of the late Fausto Diaz, sought possession of two parcels of land against the defendant, Gaudencio Eugenio. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the estate the owner and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises. Procedural History: Following the trial court's judgment on July 16, 1947, the defendant's counsel was notified on August 12, 1947. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on August 28, 1947, which was denied on September 22, 1947. The defendant then filed a notice of appeal on September 29, 1947, followed by the record on appeal on October 2, 1947, and the appeal bond on October 4, 1947. Despite objections, the trial court allowed the appeal. The plaintiff, on April 17, 1948, moved to dismiss the appeal in the Court of Appeals, arguing it was filed out of time. This motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on May 17, 1948. The Petition: Estanislao Fermin, as petitioner, filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to compel the Court of Appeals to cease further proceedings on the appeal. The petitioner argues that the motion for a new trial was pro forma and thus did not suspend the reglementary period for appeal. Consequently, the appeal was filed beyond the thirty-day period from notice of judgment, divesting the appellate court of jurisdiction. The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion to dismiss the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for new trial filed by the defendant suspended the running of the period within which an appeal should be taken. Whether the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the appeal.
Ruling
The writ of prohibition is granted. The respondent Court of Appeals is enjoined from proceeding further with the appeal taken by the respondent Gaudencio Eugenio, as the judgment in the lower court had become final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the motion for new trial suspended the reglementary period for appeal: The Court held that the motion for new trial filed by the defendant was pro forma. It did not comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that such a motion must "point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provision of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions." The Court cited its ruling in Alvero versus De la Rosa et al., G.R. No. L-286, decided March 29, 1946, which construed this provision. Because the motion was pro forma, it did not suspend the running of the period for appeal. Therefore, the filing of the notice of appeal, record on appeal, and appeal bond on September 29, October 2, and October 4, 1947, respectively, were all beyond the reglementary period of thirty days from notice of the judgment. Consequently, the appeal was not perfected on time, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance had become final and executory. On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction: Since the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period and the pro forma motion for new trial did not suspend this period, the appeal was not perfected within the time prescribed by law. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. The writ of prohibition is therefore the proper remedy to prevent the appellate court from acting on a void appeal. The Court found that the petitioner's prayer for prohibition was justified on these grounds.
Main Doctrine
A motion for new trial that does not specifically point out the findings or conclusions not supported by evidence or contrary to law, with express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or provision of law, is considered pro forma and does not suspend the running of the reglementary period for appeal.